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This dissertation examines the relationships between the mundane, our daily
habits of weather information collection, and the profound, our beliefs about
climate change and relevant policy solutions. Climate change is a hotly con-
tested, highly partisan policy issue which results in many conflicting models of
information processing. Weather information, such as daily temperature and pre-
cipitation forecasts, on the other hand is much less controversial. However, this
information is often portrayed in the context of climate information, relying on
portrayals of averages and extremes over longer periods of time. This type of in-
formation can therefore bypass many of the filters, such as identity and emotion,
that are frequently applied to climate and news information. Using a variety of
cross-sectional quantitative analyses, I examine these relationships between the
mundane, weather information, and the profound, climate change beliefs. Find-
ings first suggest individual differences help explain patterns of usage of weather
information. I also find that some, but not all, weather information sources are
related to climate change beliefs and in varying ways. These findings suggest not
all weather information is processed in the same manner; rather, some sources
may activate relevant filters while others do not. Finally, I find that information
and beliefs about climate change help explain policy preferences.
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Chapter 1
Individual Models of Information
Processing and Belief Formation
1.1 Introduction
How, when, and to what extent do our everyday actions influence our funda-
mental political beliefs? This dissertation will examine this essential question
using data on the relationship between how individuals find weather information,
for many an everyday process, and their beliefs about the existence and risk of
climate change. Everyday, individuals make choices among a variety of sources
to check the upcoming weather. This weather information is often necessarily
presented in the context of climate. Meteorologists discuss concepts such as his-
torically high temperatures while weather apps often display record temperatures
and seasonal average rainfall amounts. These descriptions are vital to individu-
als’ understanding of what to expect on any given day. The fact that today may
be hotter or wetter than usual, than average, informs a variety of other daily
decisions. Relying on this intricate link between weather and climate change, I
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posit in this dissertation that individual behaviors in checking the weather, which
sources they use, will have a relationship with their climate change beliefs. Using
unique survey data, I can examine how individuals’ information search patterns
are related to their beliefs about climate change. I ask first, if patterns of weather
information search exist and what characterizes them. I then examine how these
patterns and the sources that comprise the information search patterns are re-
lated to climate change beliefs. I examine these questions within a whole model
of individual information processing, accounting for other information search pro-
cesses such as news use that affect belief formation. Finally, I investigate potential
explanations for climate policy preferences focusing on climate change beliefs and
everyday experiences of weather.
In a more specific sense, this project then has the overarching goal of es-
tablishing a model of the effect of weather information search behaviors on the
development of climate change beliefs among the public. Put simply, individu-
als first search for or receive information from a variety of sources. They then
process this information in particular ways, resulting in changes to (or not) in
beliefs. Two competing information processing hypotheses result: either indi-
viduals act as 1) Bayesian updaters and adjust their beliefs to new information
or 2) they act in a motivated way and do not adjust their beliefs accordingly.
To elicit and describe a full model of this process I synthesize the literatures
on Risk Information Searching and Processing (RISP), primarily developed in
communication (Griffin, Dunwoody and Neuwirth, 1999), and theories of moti-
vated reasoning, primarily developed in psychology though highly influential in
political science (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2006), with the political science
literature on public opinion (Converse, 2006; Zaller, 1992; Achen, 1975; Herron
and Jenkins-Smith, 2006). Figure 1.1 graphically represents the results of these
3
efforts.
Figure 1.1: Model of Weather Information Processing
This figure represents the interaction of a variety of theories and concepts.
What is important to note is the centrality of weather information search be-
haviors and subsequent processing. One potentially important element of this
processing is the match between forecasted weather and experienced weather.
As predicted and actual weather match more frequently, associated climate mes-
saging, positive or negative, may be more persuasive. Thus, the daily nature of
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weather forecasts may have a strong cumulative effect on climate change beliefs.
These behaviors are unlike other elements in the figure because of their daily, if
not more frequent, nature for most individuals; Lazo, Morss and Demuth (2009)
estimate individuals obtain forecasts 115 times per month, or almost 4 times a
day. In political science, most attention, it seems, is dedicated to phenomenon
that only occur occasionally – elections, appointments, etc. Studies of belief
formation and public opinion, in particular the effects of media and news, con-
sider the effects of daily activities (Behr and Iyengar (1985); Iyengar and Kinder
(2010); in a comparative context, see Curran et al. (2009)); however, these stud-
ies tend to focus primarily on the effect of political and politicized information
and information sources on political beliefs and behaviors (see Prior (2007) for
a notable exception). However, the majority of the information and activity of
a publics daily lives may not be explicitly political. These everyday choices and
actions can have distinctly political effects though. As Scott (1985, p. 35) elo-
quently argues about everyday resistance, “Multiplied many thousandfold, such
petty acts of resistance by peasants may in the end make an utter shambles of
the policies.” The principle applies to everyday acts of information acquisition;
they can, in the end, fundamentally change the political beliefs of individuals.
Drawing on Figure 1.1, I will first describe competing models of the individual
and information processing. First, I describe a rational model of the individual
and information processing. I move to describing models of the individual from
public opinion which similarly emphasize the role of information, beginning with
the Receive-Accept-Sample and Knowledge Deficit models. I then examine con-
textualist models of belief formation which emphasize environmental constraints.
Next, I describe models of the individual which suggest a more stable structure
of individuals’ beliefs drawing on the revisionist tradition of research in public
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opinion and psychology. I also review the literature on Risk Information Seeking
and Processing (RISP) which draws on research in psychology, as well as commu-
nication, to examine risk information behaviors. From these theories and frame-
works, I then describe the concepts of biased search and motivated reasoning in
more detail. Finally, I describe a model of information processing which relies on
by-product learning. Having introduced these sometimes competing (sometimes
complementary) models of the individual, I proceed to discuss different types of
information in belief formation, with a focus on climate change. I first discuss the
role of weather information, such as forecasts, as a possible mechanism through
which by-product learning may occur. I then describe the weather itself as a
type of information in belief formation regarding climate change. I then examine
framing, as a type of information manipulation, which greatly affects individuals
reported beliefs about climate change. Important to these varying models is if
individuals can shift between them; drawing on work in cognitive psychology, I
describe the possibility for shifting between models of decision making and in-
formation processing. I then provide a brief description of why understanding
these models of belief formation and information processing are vital to studies
in political science and public policy. I conclude this introductory and theory
chapter with an outline of the dissertation that follows.
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1.2 Models of the Individual
1.2.1 A Rational Choice Model of the Individual and In-
formation Processing
Rational-choice models of man rely on the primary assumption that the individual
is a utility-maximizer. Underlying this assumption is another that all preferences
are known and can be rank ordered in a logical and consistent manner. Therefore,
individuals are able to make decisions which maximize utility based on these pref-
erences. As a result, individuals’ preferences, and the associated rank order, can
be understood and reconstructed using individuals behavior also known as their
revealed preference (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Varian, 1988, 2006). In a model
of political belief formation, rational choice individuals are efficient consumers
of information whose beliefs are formed based on the information received and
Bayes rule (Dickson, 2006). Bayes rule states that individuals update their prior
beliefs in accordance with feedback received about those beliefs. Under a ratio-
nal choice model, these updates will maximize potential utility. These beliefs are
more likely to be updated when the feedback signals are especially strong and con-
sistent (Ripberger et al., 2017). Thus, differences in posterior beliefs, among the
mass public, within this model are primarily attributed to either differing prior
beliefs or in differing exposures to information. The literature on biased selection
of information reviewed in Chapter 4 addresses many of the possibilities regard-
ing the second of these causes broadly and within climate change beliefs. While
the substantial literature on motivated reasoning, reviewed below, addresses the
relationships associated with the first cause. However, as Dickson (2006) notes,
the rational choice model treats these differences in prior beliefs as essentially
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exogenous and has no substantial explanation for their existence. The influence
of information is similarly centralized in Zallers (1992) Receive-Accept-Sample
(RAS) model of survey responses and belief formation reviewed below.
1.2.2 Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) Model of the Indi-
vidual and Information Processing
Scholars of public opinion have argued that the mass public, lay people, do not
have coherent ideologies or beliefs systems (Converse, 2006). Rather, responses
to survey questions are the result of the set of considerations that are at the top
of head when asked (Zaller, 1992). These are the received ideas in the Receive-
Accept-Sample (RAS) model of public opinion. These ideas are then accepted
if they are consistent with prior beliefs and applied or sampled based on their
saliency. In the RAS model, these thoughts are unstable and highly subject to
being influenced by political and media elites. Individuals lack strongly held at-
titudes or beliefs about most political or policy issues because these issues are
generally peripheral to their everyday lives. Survey responses, and the beliefs they
represent, are subject to the most recent information an individual has consumed
on the topic. The effects of this information, then, is highly contingent upon the
ideological nature of the media itself and its corresponding audience (Feldman,
Hart and Milosevic, 2017). This type of prior-belief confirming reasoning, for
Zaller, is primarily relevant for political sophisticates who are constantly look-
ing to political elites to develop their partisan belief systems. The RAS model
centralizes information in that political communication is inherently tied to atti-
tude changes. Changes in attitude are built up, gradually, over time by changes
in information that result in changes in the considerations, or received ideas,
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available to individuals. This perspective makes predicting and explaining mass
opinion and beliefs very difficult as no structure or stability of belief is posited.
A similarly elite-centric view of public opinion is offered by scholars studying the
Knowledge Deficit model.
1.2.3 The Knowledge Deficit Model of Individual Beliefs
and Information Processing
The Knowledge Deficit (KD) model also centralizes information in the process of
belief formation (Sturgis and Allum, 2004). This model posits that support for
technical policy solutions is primarily explained by the public’s level of knowledge
of that domain. More knowledge is typically regarded as creating more support
for policy while less knowledge is seen as detrimental to policy support. Thus,
this model suggests that increasing public knowledge of scientific and technical
policy areas will create support for policy interventions. This model has found
little support in the empirical literature, however, and has faced significant crit-
icism (Weber and Stern, 2011). Rather, the model has become something of
a straw-man in empirical papers examining the relationship between knowledge
and policy support. For example, Bak (2001) finds that demographic factors such
as gender explain policy preferences for science and technology much better than
scientific knowledge or even education. Others have employed more post-modern
paradigms to criticize the model. Directly in contrast to the KD model, Kellst-
edt, Zahran and Vedlitz (2008) find that ‘informedness’ is negatively correlated
with concern for global warming and personal responsibility toward it. Similarly,
confidence in scientists is negatively correlated with concern and responsibility
for global warming. In their study, high levels of information or knowledge are
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suppressing action toward policy intervention in climate change. In response
to these studies mixed findings on the effects of knowledge on belief formation,
scholars have proposed a contextualist approach to understanding public opinion
and beliefs about science, in particular.
1.2.4 Contextualist Models of Information Processing and
Individual Belief Formation
In the contextualist perspective, as identified by Sturgis and Allum (2004), un-
derstanding of science is embedded in political, economic, social, and regulatory
settings that are fundamental for explaining attitudes toward science and sci-
entific policy. However, as opposed to abandoning the KD model completely,
Sturgis and Allums’ (2004) results suggest knowledge is an important determi-
nant in attitudes toward science but is contingent on domains of science and other
important contexts, such as existing programs or structures. Thus, they argue
the two models be incorporated. In the particular domain of climate change,
Weber and Stern (2011) term this the constructivist approach. Similar in ter-
minology to the contextualist approach, they centralize the inherent difficulty
of understanding climate change. Understanding climate change is unlike other
mental tasks or mental models that individuals use daily and is therefore diffi-
cult for them to understand. Earlier work by Wynne (1996) echoes and deepens
this view. They argue public understanding of risks occurs in everyday social
practices and is continuously constructed through this process. These attitudes
are then embedded in institutions of trust, dependency, and networked relation-
ships. These institutions both enable and constrain attitude formation as well
as subsequent actions (Beck, 1996). Bulkeley (2000) finds empirical support for
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the model presented by Wynne and Beck using data from Newcastle, Australia.
They argue that institutional constraints, such as existing clean energy programs
that improve perceived efficacy, are more important to understanding public in-
volvement in issues such as climate change as opposed to individual knowledge or
government provision of information. While the contextualist approach centers
external factors in individuals belief formation, other approaches emphasize the
individual level factors that affect their belief formation.
1.2.5 Revisionist Models of Individual Belief Formation
One such approach that emphasizes individual factors in public opinion and be-
lief formation is that of the revisionist tradition. Scholars of this approach ar-
gue that individuals have structured belief systems that allow them to process
information accordingly. These previous models, RAS and KD as well as contex-
ualist/constructivist, differ somewhat from revisionist models of public opinion
and policy preferences that posit a much more stable set of attitudes and beliefs.
Revisionist models of public opinion hold that individual beliefs tend to be rea-
sonably stable and structured. Individuals typically do not succumb to whims of
information flows and the top of the head considerations that happen to be cogni-
tively accessible at a given moment. Instead they have a set of relevant heuristics
and core beliefs that structure their policy preferences (Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell
and Herron, 2004; Shapiro and Page, 1994). According to the KD model, these
heuristics are based on a lack of information while traditionalist scholars see these
as a result of the elite manipulated information environment. Revisionist scholars
argue these heuristics, on the other hand, are rational (though in a bounded way)
and extend beyond the simple availability heuristic implied by the RAS model.
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Prospect theory and insights from bounded rationality, including satisficing, are
incorporated into revisionist models (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Gigerenzer
and Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 2013). Unlike the traditionalist and KD views of the
public, revisionist scholars posit a more intelligent public. Lupia and McCubbins
(1998) present evidence that suggests participation in the policy process, and
formation of policy preferences, is not as cognitively taxing as thought.
Revisionist accounts of public opinion differ from traditional accounts in their
idea of structured belief systems such as the three-tiered system used within the
ACF (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible and Sabatier, 2014). How exactly to op-
erationalize and measure these three levels, or a structure in belief systems at all,
remains a matter of debate. Some work suggests cultural theory and its accom-
panying grid/group dimensions may serve as system around which other beliefs
revolve (Jenkins-Smith, Silva, Gupta and Ripberger, 2014; Ripberger et al., 2014;
Sotirov and Winkel, 2016). In the ACF language, cultural theory accounts for
deep core beliefs which are very stable and unlikely to change. The ACF model
of the individual then posits a set of near core (policy core) beliefs that are funda-
mental policy positions and strategies for achieving deep core, normative beliefs.
Finally, individuals have secondary beliefs that are very specific to particular
policies and their associated mechanisms (Sabatier, 1988). The role of informa-
tion, especially policy analysis, is central to the ACF model of the policy process
and learning, both at an individual and institutional level. In some cases, these
secondary beliefs are more important for understanding coalitions than policy
core or deep core beliefs. In particular, the complexity of climate change policy
and beliefs has led to groups and individuals coalescing around secondary beliefs
(Kukkonen, Ylä-Anttila and Broadbent, 2017). The authors use data in which or-
ganizations beliefs, deep core and policy core, were coded based on statements in
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various national newspapers. They demonstrate that three competing coalitions
form around deep core beliefs, but these same coalitions coalesce into one major
coalition when examining policy core beliefs (Kukkonen, Ylä-Anttila and Broad-
bent, 2017). These results suggest that policy mechanisms, which simultaneously
appeal to multiple deep-core belief systems, may be more likely to garner sup-
port in contentious areas such as climate change. While Kukkonen, Ylä-Anttila
and Broadbent (2017) primarily study the structures of belief systems, scholars
of policy beliefs using revisionist models also rely on psychological heuristics, as
described above, to understand information processing and belief formation.
1.2.6 Risk Information Seeking and Processing
These same tools, in particular heuristics for information processing, have been
used to examined how risk information and beliefs with the Risk Information
Seeking and Processing (RISP) model (Griffin, Dunwoody and Neuwirth, 1999).
This model incorporates concepts from psychology such as motivated reason-
ing, as well as communications research to examine risk information behaviors
(Griffin, Dunwoody and Yang, 2013). Research using this model has primarily
examined risks from the health and environmental domains though it has re-
cently been augmented to incorporate climate change as a relevant risk (Kahlor,
2007). The RISP model centers the idea that information insufficiency, a psycho-
logical need for information, drives these seeking and processing behaviors. This
information insufficiency is a function of individual level characteristics, such as
hazard experience and demographics, as well as perceived hazards characteristics
and affective responses to these hazards. Information sufficiency is also a func-
tion of the informational subjective norms or the pressure individuals feel to seek
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out information from their social networks. These variables help explain whether
or not an individual will seek or avoid information and if they will process this
information in either a heuristic or systematic manner.
A recent meta-analysis of RISP studies finds that these informational subjec-
tive norms along with current levels of knowledge explain a substantial variance in
these seeking/avoiding and processing, systematic vs. heuristic, behaviors (Yang,
Aloe and Feeley, 2014). Regarding climate change specifically, Kahlor (2007)
finds that informational subjective norms, pressure from ones social group, con-
tribute to when individuals are likely to seek out information. Relatedly, Yang
et al. (2014) find that informational subjective norms are positively related to
heuristic processing of climate change information. However, they also find that
those who engage in systematic processing were more likely to support climate
change mitigation policies. Therefore, social pressure to seek out climate change
information may not result in more support for mitigation policies. These same
individuals, those who report social pressure, also reported lower capacity to seek
out information (Yang et al., 2014). Despite social pressure and information inad-
equacy, some individuals still used limited and therefore biased search processes
to make conclusions about mitigation policy.
1.2.7 Biased Search and Information Processing
One heuristic incorporated directly into both revisionist models of belief forma-
tion and the RISP model is biased search processes. This biased search arises
from what psychologists, including Kruglanski and colleagues (Kruglanski and
Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski and Klar, 1987), have described as a need for specific
conclusions or structures. For them, motivation affects reasoning by directly af-
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fecting which information will be considered. Motivation regarding the use of
information can then be viewed as a form of satisficing and bounded rational
behavior Simon (2013). These satisficing behaviors occur because information
search processes require time, and energy; they are, in effect, costly for individu-
als. Individuals rely on a relatively small amount of information, or in Kunda’s
(1990) terminology a biased access of beliefs, that is accessed easily; in politics,
this is often party identification. This biased access of beliefs then dictates 1) the
information available, 2) the decision process, and 3) belief formation (Lodge,
Taber and Galonsky, 1999b). Biased search processes suggest that information
such as weather forecasts may be limited by the previously held beliefs and char-
acteristics of the individual. The literature on the evidence of biased search in
regard to political beliefs, including climate change, is more thoroughly reviewed
in Chapter 3.
1.2.8 Motivated Reasoning and Information Processing
Among the other heuristics incorporated into both the revisionist models of be-
lief formation and the RISP model is motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning
suggests individuals rely on a biased, constrained set of cognitive processes in
decision-making. Motivation can come in a variety of forms, in political science
the most common is ideological or partisan, but generally represents the idea that
individuals have preferences for outcomes of processes. Kunda (1990) provides a
coherent and extensive theoretical review of studies examining motivated reason-
ing, generally from a psychological perspective. They break motivated reason-
ing down into two general categories: reasoning driven by accuracy goals versus
driven by directional goals. Studies of climate change in political science are pri-
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marily concerned with the second type of goal. Evidence of partisan motivations
in reasoning are not usually concerned with motivation to be accurate. Rather,
the motivation is to reason in such a way that confirms prior beliefs, accurate
or not. This type of motivated reasoning can occur through a variety of mecha-
nisms, according to Kunda (1990). These mechanisms include biased accessing of
beliefs (including self-characterizations), biased memory search, outcome depen-
dency, biased beliefs about events, and biased selection of statistical heuristics.
Within political science, foundational work by Milton Lodge and Charles Taber
has incorporated many of these insights from psychology. They find that infor-
mation processing is biased toward previously held positions (Lodge, Taber and
Galonsky, 1999a).
Motivated reasoning has also been thoroughly demonstrated in the formation
of beliefs about climate change. In many studies, scholars find boomerang effects
in Republican respondents in which attempts to increase belief in climate change,
or its human causes, actually entrench skepticism or denial of climate change or
support for mitigation policies (Zhou, 2016; Hart and Nisbet, 2012). Individuals,
Republicans in particular, tend to engage in motivated reasoning by assimilating
information which fits their priors and disconfirming information which does not.
However, some cues are stronger than others and do not result in a boomerang
effect. Among skeptics such as Republicans, Feldman et al. (2012) find that
where Republicans get their news from is much more influential on their climate
change beliefs than where Democrats get their news from. This is true even
for Republicans who get news from climate change affirming sources such as
MSNBC and CNN. This research suggests Republicans are particularly sensitive
to informational effects, at least regarding climate change.
Most individuals process information in this motivated manner to protect
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their prior beliefs. Prior beliefs subject to these processes can be relatively spe-
cific, such as beliefs about the weather and climate, but they can also be more
fundamental beliefs such as ideology or culture. Frequently, the preservation of
specific beliefs, such as those surrounding climate change, is a means to an end
of preserving the more fundamental belief, such as an ideology for example. The
protection of these beliefs is then a form of identity protection (Corner, Whit-
marsh and Xenias, 2012). Some evidence suggests motivated reasoning is most
likely to occur among those most familiar with the domain (Myers et al., 2012).
Whereas those with less information or familiarity with climate change are more
likely to form opinions based on experience or experimentally manipulated stim-
uli. Motivated reasoning and the associated confirmation and disconfirmation
biases have also been demonstrated to be strongest among strong ideologues and
political sophisticates (Taber and Lodge, 2006).
Motivated reasoning has been shown to be a strong factor in many political
decisions and beliefs including voting and candidate evaluation (Redlawsk, 2002;
Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson, 2010) as well as in political belief formation
such as that described surrounding climate change, affirmative action, and gun
control (Taber and Lodge, 2006). Palm, Lewis and Feng (2017) find compelling
evidence that party identification amplifies the effects of attention to news and
public affairs when examining determinants of climate change beliefs (see also
Hamilton (2011)). Different types of news, general vs. specific environmental
news, and different sources have both been demonstrated to influence individuals
climate change beliefs (Carmichael and Brulle, 2018). These studies usually ask
respondents to identify news or information sources in a general and generic
context. They then argue that individuals learn about climate change from these
sources. Though not usually acknowledged as such, these studies are examining
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the concept of by-product learning as it applies to climate change.
1.2.9 By-product Learning as a Model of Information Pro-
cessing and Belief Formation
Downs (1957) describes by-product learning as the process through which indi-
viduals learn about politics in the course of their everyday lives. Downs describes
two paths of by-product learning. The first occurs when political information is
acquired as a side-effect of entertainment seeking behavior; the second occurs
in decisions about consumption and production (purchasing, work, etc.). De-
veloping Downs concepts, Prior (2007) conceives of the first path as obtaining
political information as a result of inefficient media environments. The market
or media environment is unable to produce media exactly as the consumer wants
it, thus inefficiency is introduced. Thus, Prior posits that as media environments
become more diverse and easier to personalize, by-product learning will decrease;
Bennett and Iyengar (2008) also note this trend as well as its implications for
political communications research. If individuals can choose information sources
that better confirm to prior beliefs or that contain less extraneous information,
by-product learning will be less likely to occur. Similarly, if individuals can choose
between a large variety of sources, they can choose the one that most specifically
fits their needs or desires. In the next section, I examine different types of infor-
mation and their roles in these various models of the individual, with a primary
focus on climate change.
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1.3 Types of Information
1.3.1 Weather Information: A Route for By-product Learn-
ing about Climate Change
The use of weather information provides a particularly interesting case of exam-
ining the relationship between the everyday and the political, in this case climate
change beliefs, for a number of reasons. First, the weather, our perceptions of it
and the information we have about it, fundamentally structure our days and the
subsequent behaviors we engage in. If we check the weather and see a forecast
for rain, we may decide to bring an umbrella with us and to cancel our plans for
an evening run. Second, weather is intricately and complexly related to climate.
Weather is both independent of and a product of past and present climatological
conditions. Weather can be defined as day-to-day, or short term, fluctuations in
precipitation, temperature, and other meteorological phenomena. On the other
hand, climate is typically defined as the average of these various meteorological
phenomena over longer periods of time, frequently thirty years or more 1. Thus,
changes in climate, then, can result in changes in weather, but weather is also
a product of short term changes in atmosphere that are independent of climate
(Jones, Thornton and Heinke, 2009). Given the intricate meteorological relation-
ship between weather and climate, it is highly likely that any attitudinal or belief
link between the two will be complex as well.
While beliefs about and perceptions of the weather itself are largely considered
apolitical2, belief in climate change is highly political, ideological and partisan
1See https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/weather-vs-climate for a useful, simplified de-
scription. See https://www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq/difference-between-
weather-and-climate for a more detailed description.
2See http://theconversation.com/the-weather-is-now-political-77791 for a discussion of the
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(Hamilton et al., 2015; McCright and Dunlap, 2011b; Shao et al., 2014). The
political nature of climate change and the concept of by-product learning suggest
that the variety of information sources of weather information may allow for
individuals to choose sources which reduce their contact with belief-disconfirming
information. Thus, by-product learning may be low; therefore, the relationship
between information seeking behaviors, which sources individuals choose, and
climate change beliefs may be small.
However, the relationship between weather information and climate change
is more complex than this description suggests. Rather, the use of weather in-
formation reflects a hybrid between both paths of by-product learning. Seeking
weather information is not always an entertainment behavior, except for those
who gain utility simply from knowing about the weather. A good example of this
may be individuals who chase storms. However, a more common example may
simply be the entertainment derived from watching the local newscaster discuss
the forecast for tomorrow or the next day. In either case, we may expect some by-
product learning about climate change to occur. Moreover, the decision to seek
out weather information is not itself an economic production or consumption de-
cision, except when individuals use weather information purchased through an
app, such as RadarScopeTM, or a website such as AccuWeatherTM. In almost all
cases, though, seeking out and processing weather information affects production
and consumption decisions. The examples of this are endless. A rain forecast may
prompt someone to purchase an umbrella or change their travel plans (Hamilton
and Lau, 2005; Lise and Tol, 2002). Weather, and its relationship with climate
change, has and will continue to have significant effects on individual and corpo-
rate production and consumption decisions. Thus, learning about climate from
changing nature of this statement and the potentially political nature of weather.
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mundane weather information, then, can be typified as by-product learning of a
potential third type.
By-product learning, in this case, comes about because of the entanglement
of climate information in daily forecasts. This is similar to the second path of
by-product learning, through production/consumption decisions. In this path
information about the economy, usually, is learned because it is wrapped up in
those decisions; however, the weather-climate type of by-product learning does
not inherently rely on market mechanisms to occur. In many cases, it is simply
consumption of information, absent the economic meaning of the term. Weather-
climate by-product learning can occur both as a result of entertainment and
consumption, both of an economic and purely informational nature. Thus, it is
possible to expect that the relationship between weather information sources and
climate change beliefs may be stronger than previously described and otherwise
expected.
1.3.2 The Weather as Information and Belief Formation
On the other hand, learning from the weather itself is seen as more direct, as
opposed to by-product. As such, a relatively new and robust, though some-
what atheoretical, literature has attempted to examine the relationship between
weather fluctuations and climate change beliefs (Weber, 2016). Local weather and
deviations from average, usually temperature or rainfall, have been demonstrated
across studies as a relatively strong predictor of belief in climate change (Hornsey
et al., 2016). Experiences with extreme weather, however, have a much weaker,
relationship with climate change beliefs (Hornsey et al., 2016). Although both
local weather variations, among temperature and precipitation, and increases in
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the frequency of extreme weather events are potential results of climate change,
these findings suggest type of weather event matters in explaining climate change
beliefs. Specifically, it is daily deviations from temperature and weather norms
that are influential in shaping climate change beliefs while anomalous events have
a very limited effect. However, it is important to note that in many of these stud-
ies the effect of weather and temperature-related changes or cues are contingent
(e.g. upon partisanship, see Hamilton and Stampone (2013); upon geography,
see Lee et al. (2015)).
Some research in this vein examines the relationship between perceived, as
opposed to actual, temperature and climate change beliefs and worry (Li, Johnson
and Zaval, 2011; Zaval et al., 2014). In their cross-sectional experimental study,
Zaval et al. (2014) attempt to examine the mechanism behind these findings; their
experiments suggest individuals’ attend to and give undue weight to more easily
available information, such as today’s temperature, rather than more relevant but
less accessible information such as seasonal or yearly averages. Other research has
shown that perceptions of local weather change, temperature or precipitation, are
strongly positively related with belief in and risk perceptions of global climate
change across a variety of geographic and cultural contexts (Li, Johnson and
Zaval (2011), in US and Australia; Howe (2018), in Norway; Lee et al. (2015),
in Africa and Asia). These studies, relying on cross-sectional survey data, have
confirmed that there is a strong relationship between perceived weather patterns,
belief in climate change, and the risk perceptions thereof.
Moving beyond the relationship between perceived weather and climate change
beliefs, some scholars have attempted to examine the relationship between actual
temperatures and climate change beliefs. Schuldt and Roh (2014b) find that un-
seasonably cold temperatures can reduce belief when the phrase global warming
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is used but not when the phrase climate change is used. These experiments vary-
ing the frame or name or the underlying concept are discussed in greater detail
elswhere in this chapter. They also find these effects can be induced using visual
primes of unseasonable cold in a survey experiment. These effects are especially
prominent among skeptics (i.e. Republicans) however they are contingent upon
question wording. In a similar cross-sectional study combining experimental and
observational data, Joireman, Truelove and Duell (2010) find complementary pat-
terns to Schuldt and Roh. Specifically, they use heat exposure and heat primes
to examine increased prevalence of belief in global warming.
Examining the effect of both cold and hot temperatures, Hamilton and Stam-
pone (2013) find that unseasonably warm temperatures on the day of survey
participation increase agreement with the statement that humans are causing
climate change. Conversely, unseasonably cool temperatures on the day of sur-
vey participation are associated with decreased agreement with said statement.
However, this effect is only present among independents, not Democratic or Re-
publican partisans. These findings suggest Democrats and Republicans may be
less sensitive to daily or momentary changes in weather in regards to their beliefs
about climate change and partake in motivated reasoning regarding tempera-
tures3. Partisans process the temperature as either confirming their prior belief
or as irrelevant; both paths represent motivated reasoning. Independents, on
the other hand, process unseasonable temperatures differently, with less bias.
Similarly, Egan and Mullin (2012) use a nationwide survey to demonstrate that
recent experiences of deviations from average temperatures are positively corre-
lated with belief in global warming, even when controlling for partisanship and
3For example, climate scientists beliefs about climate change may not be responsive to brief
weather changes or primes, due to their prior beliefs about climate change. This suggests other
reasons for these differential responses may exist, such as domain knowledge.
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ideology4. Specifically, Egan and Mullin (2012) use a measure that compares the
temperature of the seven days prior to survey participation to the thirty-year
average (1971-2000) and takes the average of these differences. Focusing on cli-
mate, as opposed to weather, Shao et al. (2014) find that experiencing hotter
summers, over ten-years, is positively correlated with risk perceptions of climate
change. In a counter example, a study of Floridians by Marlon et al. (2018)
suggests that local temperature experiences have little effect on climate change
risk perceptions.
In some cases, experience of extreme weather has been shown to be related
to climate change beliefs. For example, Spence et al. (2011) find that experience
with flooding, a potential side effect of climate change, is related to increased
belief in the occurrence of climate change and its corresponding risk. However,
these findings are less well established than those of the effects of temperature,
either perceived or actual. A recent longitudinal study finds limited influence of
natural disasters on climate change beliefs (Palm, Lewis and Feng, 2017). One
year prior, an extensive meta-analysis by Hornsey et al. (2016) also found that
natural disasters have a limited effect on climate change beliefs. Palm, Lewis and
Feng (2017) also find limited support for the effect of drought and hot summers
(in contrast to Shao et al. (2014)) but do find evidence that warm winters effect
belief in climate change. The panel nature of these data represents, in some sense,
an improvement over previous cross-sectional studies; however, the study relies
on a crude measure of change in climate change beliefs and relies on only two
waves of data collected relatively far apart in time. Using a similar panel design,
but with many more iterations over regular (3-month) intervals, Ripberger et al.
4Most deviations from average, in this study, were positive. However, they also find devi-
ations from average which were negative are associated with slightly lower levels of belief in
global warming.
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(2017) examine the relationship between observed meteorological phenomenon
and perceived meteorological phenomenon. They find that individuals typically
perceive anomalies in weather (temperature and rainfall) accurately, except at
the most extreme liberal and conservative poles of ideologies. These studies drive
home the unique and complex relationship between weather and climate change
beliefs.
1.3.3 Frames as Information in Belief Formation
More directly, many studies have demonstrated how the information individu-
als are presented with in the survey context have large effects on their reported
climate change beliefs. Findings have suggested that even small differences in
information presented to individuals can affect their response to whether they
believe climate change is occurring. For example, scholars have examined the
framing effects of climate change vs. global warming (Schuldt, Konrath and
Schwarz, 2011; Schuldt, Enns and Cavaliere, 2017). The effects of this framing
or wording choice are particularly relevant for Republican respondents. In fact,
research on beliefs in climate change have found that Republicans are more sen-
sitive to various framing and informational treatments (Hart and Nisbet, 2012;
Zhou, 2016; Schuldt and Roh, 2014a; Feldman et al., 2012). Other research by
Schuldt and Pearson (2016) finds that non-White respondents were unaffected by
framing (climate change vs. global warming) effects. Studies in these traditions
are primarily reliant on survey experimental methods to measure opinion changes
or content analysis of media to measure the frames themselves (see Chong and
Druckman (2007) for an excellent review of the topic). The simplistic, tradition-
alist model of public opinion would suggest these framing manipulations should
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affect all respondents or at affect only the less politically sophisticated. And as
Chong and Druckman (2007) note, some do interpret these framing effects as
support for traditionalist views of public opinion (Riker, 1986; Zaller, 1992; Bar-
tels, 2003). However, the contingent nature of these effects, at least in the case of
climate change, suggest a more complex picture. Some individuals may be more
or less susceptible to small frames or information changes, suggesting individuals
have distinct belief systems that are differentially manipulable.
While these experiments result in estimates of the framing effects, they do not
measure changes in public opinion because they, primarily, do not rely on inter-
subject responses. Rather they rely on comparing differences between experimen-
tal groups. Scheufele (1999) presents a critique of framing studies, suggesting a
typology of framing effects and that these effects be viewed as a sub-type of media
effects. In so doing, Scheufele acknowledges both the importance of the media
broadly as well as the underlying idea that frames are, in effect, informational
manipulations. Thus, studies of framing, such as the those referenced herein on
the effects of question wordings, speak to the importance of information in belief
formation more broadly. That is not to say other individual characteristics do
not help explain individuals beliefs. Rather, these studies also demonstrate the
contingencies of media and framing effects.
The synthesis of these literatures and the culmination of their reviews sug-
gests a model with a broad conceptualization of what information is and what
information matters. If even a few words in a survey question can affect reported
beliefs, then usually apolitical information sources, such as weather forecasts, may
also be important. The model must also incorporate both structural conceptions
of belief systems as well as heuristics of processing in order to understand how
individuals form specific beliefs, such as those about climate change. Incorporat-
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ing structure into belief systems both allows for understanding certain heuristic
processing methods, such as motivated reasoning, as well as a more systematic,
deliberative methods of processing information (such as in Skilled Decision The-
ory, see Cokely et al. (2018) for a review). The resulting model is depicted in
Figure 1.1 and provides the basis of the analyses presented throughout this dis-
sertation.
1.4 Do Individuals Shift Between Models of In-
formation Processing?
The applicability of the variety of models of information processing and belief
formation described up to this point may be contingent on a variety of factors.
Specifically, both individual differences and contextual factors may contribute
to which model is most applicable in a certain situation. Research in decision-
making in psychology has contributed significantly to our understanding of when
different models of decision-making apply and what contributes to these contin-
gencies (Cokely and Kelley, 2009; Aczel et al., 2015). Cokely and Kelley (2009)
find that people with higher cognitive ability are more likely to make choices
consistent with expected value calculations, that is follow the rational model of
man. However, importantly, they note that these individuals rarely made the
expected value calculations but rather relied on elaborative heuristic search pro-
cesses. Those with lower cognitive ability, on the other hand, relied on fewer
elaborations and simpler processes to arrive at their choices which were nor-
matively (i.e. had lower payouts) less beneficial. Research in a similar vein
by Ghazal, Cokely and Garcia-Retamero (2014) finds that individuals who were
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more numerate were again more deliberative, i.e. took longer to make decisions,
and therefore made more “rational” and normatively superior decisions (again,
higher payouts). These findings have been consistent across both medical and
financial domains (Garcia-Retamero et al., 2019). Broadly, these findings suggest
that individual factors, such as numeracy and working memory, affect which type
of information processing models individuals use – deliberative System Two pro-
cesses as opposed to intuitive System One processes (Stanovich and West, 2000;
Kahneman, 2011). Additionally, this work suggests some individuals can shift
between decision-making strategies and cognitive processes.
One possible reason for these shifts may be that context matters for the cog-
nitive strategies individuals use to make decisions (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989;
Gigerenzer and Hug, 1992). Examining risky decisions, specifically Weber, Blais
and Betz (2002) find that individuals are not consistently risk averse or risk seek-
ing across five different areas such as health or finance. In particular, gender and
perceptions of benefits explain participation in risk taking as opposed to direct
risk perceptions. In other work, Blais and Weber (2001) find that life domains,
such as the difference between plagiarizing or buying a car, affect both individu-
als’ decision strategies and behavioral outcomes. For example, respondents were
much less likely to report relying on an authority’s advice for making the deci-
sion to plagiarize than they were to use emotions to help make their decision.
This research suggests that certain social, relational contexts may differ from
economic contexts for relatively mundane decision tasks. Another possible dif-
ference in decision-making is one from experience as opposed to decision-making
from description. Hertwig et al. (2004) find that for decisions of description, such
as those regarding weather forecasts, respondents overweight the probability of
rare events in accordance with prospect theory, but do the opposite, underweight
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the probability for rare events, for decisions from experience. However, Fox and
Hadar (2006) argue that these findings are a result of sampling error and that
both types of decisions are suspect to prospect theory. In another paper, Hadar
and Fox (2009) further describe the situations in which the experience-description
gap is smaller or larger. Specifically, the underweighting of the probability of rare
events for experience decisions only occurs when rare-events, i.e. tornadoes, are
never experienced. While Hertwig et al. (2004) describe weather forecasts as cre-
ating decisions from description because the probabilities of various alternatives
are described, weather itself may create decisions from experience. That is, we
also experience repeated iterations of weather and then come to conclusions about
the likelihood of certain weather events as a result. Weather and forecasts, then,
may provide a hybrid type of decision where both description, the forecast, and
experience, our lived daily experiences of weather, may affect decision making.
While these studies focus on particular decisions, usually measured in labora-
tory settings, their conclusions can, to some extent, transfer to belief formation.
Specifically, taken as a whole this body of research suggests that individual and
contextual differences are important for understanding decision outcomes and
cognitive processes. These lessons suggest that models of belief formation de-
scribed above, similar to models of decision making, may systematically apply to
different individuals to different extents in different contexts.
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1.5 Why Individual Information Processing Mat-
ters
1.5.1 For Weather Information
Weather information, such as forecasts, can have major implications for the enjoy-
ment of individuals’ daily lives. Having accurate forecasts that convey relevant
information about fluctuations in daily temperatures, precipitation, and other
meteorological phenomena allows individuals to plan their days accordingly. The
number of examples in which having an accurate forecast could affect your daily
life are numerous. Especially in terms of daily fluctuations, the examples are
obvious. People knowing that tomorrow is going to be much colder than today
allows them to wear a more appropriate coat. Similarly, we may not plan to
have a picnic on a day it is likely to rain, according to a forecast, or at least we
may bring an umbrella with us for the day for those tasks that are unavoidable.
Beyond our daily lives, but in a similar manner, weather forecasts can have major
economic effects when they may lead to the cancellation of major events or even,
more commonly, school closures.
Examining why daily weather information matters from a climate perspec-
tive, the connections may be slightly more abstract but still clearly important.
The first connection is to events that are especially significant deviations from
the climatological average. For example, a historic high temperature that makes
it unsafe to go outside may require a specific behavioral response from individ-
uals. The description of the event in climatological terms may better convince
individuals to take an appropriate action such as staying inside. Secondly, as
climate change occurs, severe weather, extreme highs/lows in temperature, and
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periods of drought or high rainfall are likely to occur with increasing frequency
(Van Aalst, 2006). Thus, individuals who receive accurate, and climatologically
framed weather information, may be more attuned to these changes. Even if
the events are not severe, as the one described above, they will still have effects
on people’s daily lives. Having more historically hot days may lead to individu-
als choosing to stay inside more, for example. Individuals seek out and process
this information so that they can live out their lives without suffering from the
weather and wear the appropriate clothing. In the process, they may be acquiring
information about the climate and climate change without necessarily recognizing
it.
1.5.2 For Political Science and Public Policy
One reason information processing and belief formation is so important in po-
litical science is the relationship between public opinion, or beliefs, and policy
and policy change. For example, in the ACF model, the role of public opinion is
largely viewed as an environmental constraint external to the policy subsystem,
in particular moments, and as a possible cause of policy change. Interestingly this
conception evokes the idea others have called public mood and its relationship
with policy change (Stimson, 2012; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002; Stim-
son, 2018). The conception of policy mood suggests various policy preferences
move in tandem in a general ideological, left-right, manner over time. The policy
mood model then suggests policy moves subsequent to these changes in opinion.
The thermostatic model takes this one step further suggesting policy is changed
as a response to public opinion but then the public acts as a thermostat. After the
initial policy change in one direction, public opinion will change in the other di-
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rection to keep the policy at the “right temperature” (Wlezien, 1995; Soroka and
Wlezien, 2010). These models are focused on the relationship between change in
public opinion and policy change over time. In so doing, they focus on aggregate
changes in public opinion that take place over time. They are relatively mute
as to where these opinion changes come from, other than from negative policy
feedback (Wlezien, 1995). Research by Monroe (1998) and a meta-analysis by
Burstein (2003) suggest policy is responsive to public opinion in a majority of
cases. Monroe (1998) found that policy outcomes matched with public opinion
in 63% of cases in the 60s and 70s but only with 55% of cases in the 80s and
90s. Burstein’s (2003) meta-analysis of the relationship between public opinion
and policy change suggests that in 75% of the 52 relationships, across 30 studies,
public opinion is significantly related to or affects policy outcomes.
These models of individual information processing are also fundamental to
our understanding of the political realm and policy process because individuals
make up the institutions which create these policy changes. Some scholars sug-
gest institutions are subject to many of the constraints of individual processing
described in these various models because institutions are simply aggregations of
many individuals processing (Jones, 1994)5. In these institutions, information is
frequently viewed as a resource used to mobilize support for or against a par-
ticular policy option or policy change. This information can come as a result
of top-down directives or bottom-up initiatives and each information type serves
different purposes (Workman, 2015). Information then is seen as an important
resource to promote policy learning within institutions, individuals, and coali-
tions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In some instances, information is a
product of routine and standard operating procedures; however, in other cases
5This could also be considered a description of democratic theory more generally.
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information is the result of an isolated event. Following from these functions,
institutions have a variety of channels for producing and processing information
and institutions can simultaneously process various streams of information.
One key difference between institutions and individuals is that individuals
can only serially process information, despite facing a similar abundance of in-
formation sources. Also congruent to institutional models, many models of the
individual view information as a potential resource to change individual positions
on policy or political beliefs. How this process occurs varies depending upon the
individual as well as the information being processed and its goal. Not all in-
formation is created equal nor are all individuals created equal. Information is
processed depending on its salience, valence, and domain among other charac-
teristics. Individuals process information according to their ideologies, cultures,
genders, among various other characteristics. In processing information, indi-
viduals often create knowledge which is then a resource for developing other
individual beliefs (Ripberger et al., 2012, 2017). In particular, some information
is more political and politicized than other information. Politicized information
is of particular importance in policy domains such as climate change. As demon-
strated below, scholars have devoted significant attention to the political nature
of information surrounding climate change (see McCright and Dunlap (2011b) for
a review). However, other information, such as weather forecasts, may be seen
as generally less political and more neutral. Less political information is no less
important than politicized information and likely makes up the bulk of informa-
tion individuals interact with on a regular basis. Importantly, this information
may or may not be processed in a political manner, i.e. according to ideology or
partisanship.
This lack of a political nature may be one of the primary reasons weather
33
information, such as forecasts, has yet to be examined as a potential factor con-
tributing to individuals beliefs about climate change. However, this information
is crucial to our lives. We use it to plan our days and make decisions ranging from
what to wear to whether to attend major community events. This information is
also abundant, with a plethora of sources available to individuals. As information
search is costly, for all information including that about the weather, individu-
als may rely on heuristics in their search processes. They may engage in biased
search processes relying on a relatively narrow set of sources that are related
to their various identities and demographics. These search processes are subse-
quently important as the weather information we come in contact with everyday
also communicates information about the climate and its potentially changing
nature. Understanding todays high temperature in terms of its relationship to
the historical high relies on both weather and climate information to convey a
message to the user. Weather information, thus, may sneak past motivational
filters in its effect on climate change beliefs and by-product learning may take
place.
This dissertation revolves around these two central ideas: search processes
(and the potential for biased ones) in weather information and by-product learn-
ing that occurs about climate change in these processes. In Chapter 2, I ask
if there are different patterns of weather information usage or search. I expect
that individuals use a variety of search strategies when seeking out weather in-
formation. I then characterize the individual level factors, such as ideology and
demographics, which help explain the use of these patterns. In Chapter 3, I
then examine how these search processes are related to climate change beliefs. I
expect that weather information use patterns will have a small but important re-
lationship with these beliefs, that primarily occurs through indirect or by-product
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learning. However, I also examine the possibility for motivated reasoning to be
occurring at this stage. I examine the magnitude of the relationship between
weather information and climate change beliefs by comparing it to other, more
commonly studied types of information. This chapter considers the effects of
weather information as a part of a broader information environment. In Chapter
4, I then examine how beliefs about climate change, certainty in its causes and
risk perceptions, are associated with policy preferences. I also examine how the
everyday, mundane experiences of weather are related to climate change risk per-
ceptions and policy preferences. Finally, I conclude in Chapter 5 with a summary
of the limitations and the implications of this research for scientists studying cli-
mate change beliefs and communication. I argue that scholars must consider this
broad information environment and the routines individuals build within it to
best understand climate change beliefs.
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Chapter 2
Patterns of Weather Information
Use and Their Predictors
2.1 Introduction
Mundane daily behaviors directly affect the construction of our society, democ-
racy, and the state of our physical environment; yet, many of these behaviors
effects on our belief systems are not well understood. One of the most frequent
of those behaviors is using media to access various forms of information. We
might check social networks to maintain relationships with family and friends
or watch the news to know whats going on in our neighborhoods and the world
around us. To some extent, these behaviors affect our beliefs about democracy
and relevant policy issues. Our social media circles and our choices of news
networks sometimes create echo chambers which amplify polarization (Colleoni,
Rozza and Arvidsson (2014), see Jasny, Waggle and Fisher (2015) for a climate
change example). In these cases, the explicit partisan nature of the information
source or the information itself may be apparent. However, much of the routine
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information collection we do is not explicitly partisan or even, necessarily, policy
relevant.
As such, these aspects of life may not invoke active reflection from citizens
themselves or study from academics. However, the daily accumulation of behavior
and information over time can greatly affect individuals beliefs. This accumu-
lation can greatly influence individuals ideologies and beliefs about policy and
politics and subsequently the structure of our democracy and society. In some
cases, the connections may be relatively well-established such as that between
Fox News and conservative ideologies and beliefs (Stroud, 2008, 2011). With re-
gard to the environment, daily individual behaviors such as recycling also have
obvious consequences. However, in other cases, the connections between daily
behavior, media environments and political beliefs may be less clear though no
less important. One such area is that of the media environment for weather and
its relationship with beliefs about climate change. Beliefs about climate change
are especially vital to understand as it represents a wicked policy problem with
a particularly long-time horizon.
These time horizons are often implicitly communicated in the weather infor-
mation individuals consume. In other cases, this type of climate, and climate
change, information is included explicitly to educate the viewers of broadcast
meteorology, that is local television station viewers, about climate change (Zhao
et al., 2014). These explicit climate change information interventions studied
were effective at educating viewers to the causes and risks of climate change;
however, the question arises about what happens in the absence of direct inter-
vention. The opportunity for by-product learning still exists given the nature of
the information presented; however, this is complicated by the complex media
environment regarding weather in the United States. Organizations across the
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public and private sector using a variety of media tools create an information rich
environment.
This information rich environment is not unique to the U.S. but may be espe-
cially relevant in contexts where competition between information sources is high.
Individuals face choices between an almost overwhelming number of options for
information sources on any topic imaginable. Information about the weather,
such as but not limited to forecasts, is no exception to this. People make choices
daily about checking these many sources; however, we know very little about who
uses what sources or how much they rely on these sources. Because these infor-
mation sources can vary in their reliability, understanding patterns among their
users has distinct implications for the creation of a weather aware public. For
example, the National Weather Service is a highly reliable and scientific source
of information about the weather while ones family and friends are highly infor-
mal and potentially less reliable. If certain individuals are predisposed toward
using less formal or informal information sources, outreach from formal and more
reliable sources may be able to target those susceptible to lacking information.
Information sources are rarely used in isolation, though. Therefore, rather than
focusing on sources individually, I examine how information sources are used in
tandem and how this may result in various types or classes of weather information
seekers.
The following chapter begins by reviewing the relevant literature on infor-
mation seeking behaviors and information and information source quality and
reliability. I then introduce the survey data and the measurement model, con-
comitant variable latent class analysis, used to examine demographic and other
correlates of weather information usage. First, I uncover four distinct patterns of
weather information source usage. A relatively similar proportion, approximately
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0.25 to 0.30, of individuals fall into three of the four categories, suggesting no
particular information pattern accounts for the majority of the sample. I find
that socio-demographic characteristics, particularly age and education, help ex-
plain patterns of weather information seeking behaviors. I also find that political
dispositions, especially ideology, are related to patterns of weather information
search. Finally, I end with the implications of this chapter for future research on
weather information and the subsequent analyses.
2.2 Literature Review
In their seminal article, Lazo, Morss and Demuth (2009) describe the process
of valuing weather forecasts as four steps from sources to perceptions to uses to
values. Following from this framework, I focus exclusively on examining which
sources individuals use. In a later paper, Demuth, Lazo and Morss (2011) ex-
amine the first three steps of this model. In so doing, they attempt to ascertain
patterns of source usages of forecast information. Regarding sources, they find no
adequate factor solution, despite most individuals in their data reporting using
many sources. This suggests the correlation structure of the sources they consider
cannot be summarized easily. However, their method of analysis considers only
correlation between the individual indicators but does not consider the patterns
of use of all indicators at once, by each individual. With the exception of this
group of researchers at NCAR (Lazo, Morss and Demuth, 2009; Morss, Lazo and
Demuth, 2010; Demuth, Lazo and Morss, 2011), research from meteorology as
well as the social sciences broadly primarily ignores the daily, routine gathering
of weather information. Instead researchers in these fields are primarily interested
in where individuals get severe weather information from, including but not lim-
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ited to how individuals get specific NWS severe weather warning products. Thus,
the majority of research on the determinants and effects of weather information
takes place in a severe weather context such as tornadoes or hurricanes.
Research examining the uses of severe weather information, while potentially
a different phenomenon from routine weather information, has resulted from a
robust interdisciplinary tradition. In particular, scholars of emergency manage-
ment and disaster response have focused on Mileti and Sorensen’s (1990) model of
warning systems and Lindell and Perry’s model of protective action decision mak-
ing (PADM) (see Lindell and Perry 2012 for an overview). Both models prioritize
the provision of information from an authority and rely on trust in this authority
to provoke a response from individuals. However, the recent expansion of com-
munication technologies such as social media have made the both the information
environment for warning/severe weather information and for routine/daily fore-
casts more complex (Reuter and Kaufhold, 2018). In particular, information is
no longer communicated primarily in an authority-to-citizen (A2C) manner but
also can be communicated in a citizen-to-citizen (C2C) manner.
Research in these theoretical domains has attempted to examine the plethora
of available information sources and individual-level differences that are associ-
ated with differing information source usages. Studies of tornado warnings ask
interview or survey participants to identify sources such as sirens, television, or
friends and family (Balluz et al., 2000; Brown et al., 2002; Hammer and Schmidlin,
2002; Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Biddle, 2007; Sherman-Morris, 2010; Paul
and Stimers, 2012; Paul, Stimers and Caldas, 2015). In these studies, the most
important source of information varies. Sherman-Morris (2010) finds cell phones
were the most commonly reported source followed by computer messaging and in-
terpersonal sources. Most research finds television is the the most common source
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of warning information (Balluz et al., 2000; Hammer and Schmidlin, 2002). In
many of these studies, including the one by Comstock and Mallonee (2005), sirens,
a source unavailable in routine contexts, were the second most reported source
of tornado warnings (or first, in Paul and Stimers 2012). Studying hurricanes,
Drabek (2001) found that the news media was the most important source for
receiving information about the storm, followed by information from contacting
local officials and relatives. These studies have demonstrated that a variety of
sources are used to acquire information in severe weather contexts (Robinson,
Pudlo and Wehde, N.d.). Population characteristics as well as event characteris-
tics help explain the differences in which sources are used most (Wehde, Pudlo
and Robinson, 2019). While this provides an understanding of the source which
may provide the widest reach, it reduces a complex process, one where many
sources can be accessed, to a simple binary: most used source vs. all others.
2.2.1 Multiple Sources of Severe Weather Information
Despite the focus on the most-used source, research has suggested that the inter-
action of the various sources can be important for individuals response behaviors.
According to a review of hazard warning systems, Sorensen (2000) finds general
but limited support for the positive relationship between multiple warning sources
and response to the warning. More recent research by Paul, Stimers and Caldas
(2015) finds that the use of one or more information source is positively associated
with compliance with the tornado warning. Even more recently, Miran, Ling and
Rothfusz (2018) also find that the number of information sources, as opposed to
just more than one, is positively associated with protective action. Sorensen’s re-
view and recent research suggest the use of multiple information sources is likely
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an important factor in studying weather and warning systems. Given the domain,
it is unsurprising these studies only examine information sources in the event of
extreme or severe weather; however, understanding patterns of information usage
in routine weather may set the stage for which sources are available or familiar
to individuals in the event of severe weather. Also importantly, these studies do
not examine what combinations of these sources are used. Even those that em-
phasize the importance of more than one source (Paul, Stimers and Caldas, 2015;
Miran, Ling and Rothfusz, 2018) ignore exactly which sources are used; respon-
dents could be using websites, family and friends, television or any other source
that could deliver the warning or information. Though individuals are allowed
to report receiving information from multiple sources, scholars have primarily
focused on either the rank ordering of these sources, (see Sherman-Morris 2010,
Comstock and Mallonee 2005, among others), or simply the number of sources
used.
Sorensen’s (2000) review also suggests that the specific warning channel may
matter; some warning channels might increase protective action taking while
others might actually decrease protective action taking. They find electronic and
media sources have mixed effects on responses while sirens decrease responses
to warnings. These sources also have differential effectiveness at reaching the
population. Rogers and Sorensen (1991) find that permanent sirens combined
with telephones or tone alert radios reach the population most rapidly. The
news media reaches the population at the slowest rate, followed up by sirens in
isolation. Though in the context of warning systems and severe weather events,
these studies suggest that sources differ in their ability to provoke action quickly
enough. Comstock and Mallonee (2005) suggest that when individuals receive
warning or storm information from multiple sources, certain ones, such as weather
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changes, are less likely to provoke protective action. They find that some sources,
such as environmental cues, which are most prevalent in conveying information
about the storm are the least likely to promote protective action. The differences
in both reception and response are multi-faceted in that they consider the speed
of information traveling, the effectiveness of communication, and the interaction
of a variety of potential information sources. Given the consistency of the use
of multiple sources and their varying effects, it is likely that patterns of use of
weather information sources and their effects in non-severe, day-to-day settings
are similarly complex.
Understanding these complexities, and their relationships with political be-
liefs, is important given the value of forecasts. Lazo et al (2009) estimate that
forecasts in the U.S. generate over $30 billion worth of value compared to just
over $5 billion in costs and those forecasts come from a plethora of sources. Echo-
ing research on warning systems, the authors find that local tv stations are the
most common source for weather forecasts, accessed approximately 34 times a
month (Lazo et al 2009). Direct government sources such as the NWS webpage
and NOAA Weather radio are used much less frequently, only accessed 8.3 and
2.1 times per month respectively. However, as the authors note, much of the
information contained in local TV forecasts and all other forecasts is based on
information created by the government. Thus it is difficult to parse out the use
of government information, precisely, or its value to the consumer. Though the
base information originates from the government, weather information has been,
until recently, rarely politicized. Therefore, the effects of partisanship on its us-
age may be relatively limited. Other individual factors, such as age or race, may
be more important in explaining differences in patterns of weather information
source usage.
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In the subsequent study, I analyze a survey of Oklahomans to examine pat-
terns in their routine, as opposed to extreme, weather information source usage.
I find evidence that information sources are not used in isolation but are used by
individuals in a distinct set of theoretically and practically interesting patterns.
Additionally, I then move to examining the demographic and political belief sys-
tem precursors which help explain the use of these various weather information
use patterns.
2.3 Data and Methods
In this study, I use data from the Meso-Scale Integrated Socio-geographic Net-
work (M-SISNet), a longitudinal (panel) survey, using an address-based sampling
frame, that continuously measures public perceptions of climatic conditions and
beliefs in Oklahoma, a conservative state where a large fraction of the population
is skeptical about human-caused climate change (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017).
M-SISNet surveys are administered at the end of each season (winter, spring,
summer, fall). Basic values, beliefs, and political predispositions are measured
once a year on the winter survey. Additionally, questions about frequency of
weather information source usage are asked every quarter. Much more detailed
information about the data source can be found in Jenkins-Smith et al. (2017).
These questions are used to construct a measurement model using Latent Class
Analysis (LCA) with concomitant variables. For the analysis in this and sub-
sequent chapters, I rely on only wave 18 of the survey. This wave was fielded
between June 4th and July 23rd of 2018 and asked questions pertaining to the
preceeding spring meteorological season. A total of 2,246 individuals replied to
the survey and the median completion time was approximately 33 minutes. I
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rely on this wave because in it we asked a larger battery of questions related to
climate change beliefs and policy.
For the construction of the classes, we specifically asked, “How frequently do
you get information about the WEATHER from each of the following sources?”
Newspapers
Non-government Internet websites (such as weather.com)
Government sponsored Internet websites (such as noaa.gov, Oklahoma Mesonet)
Local TV (television) news
Cable TV (television) news (such as The Weather Channel)
Radio
Family, friends, or colleagues
Social Media, such as Facebook and Twitter
Cell phone applications or automated text messages
Other (please specify)
Individuals were able to choose from the following options for each of these
sources:
Several times a day (6)
About once a day (5)
Several times per week (4)
About once per week (3)
Less than once per week (2)
Never (1)
Figure 2.1 displays the means for each of these indicators for the full analysis
sample, all 1,819 individuals with data for each variable included. Local television
is, by far, the most popular source for weather information across all respondents,
used almost each day. On the other hand, newspapers, social media, and gov-
ernment websites are much less popular being used less than once per week on
average. Family and friends, phone apps and the radio, on the other hand, are
relatively more popular with each exceeding an average of 3, or used about once
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per week, on the scale. Other websites and cable TV fill out the middle levels of
usage between less than once per week and once per week.
Figure 2.1: Mean Information Source Usages
LCA is used in this study for a number of purposes. First, LCA is suited
for polytomous input data, such as this. Indicator or manifest variables do not
have to be binary or continuous but can take on multiple categories. Second, as
compared to other measurement models such as factor or principal components
analyses, LCA takes advantage of correlations between patterns of responses as
opposed to correlations between the responses to the individual questions them-
selves. This modeling technique stratifies the manifest, or observed, variables by
identifying a latent, or unobserved, categorical variable to eliminate confounding
between the manifest variables. This relies on the conditional or local inde-
pendence assumption which states that all manifest variables are statistically
independent when conditioned on the latent variable (Linzer, Lewis et al., 2011).
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This latent variable is represented by a probabilistic outcome for each individual
for each class (for each survey wave, in this case). Individuals can then be catego-
rized by the class into which they more likely fall. Thus, individuals with similar
sets of response will cluster into the same latent class. Finally, LCA itself does
not identify the number of relevant classes or categories. Rather, because the
method relies on the distributional assumptions of the manifest variables, LCA
produces a series of fit statistics to determine appropriate model selection and
fit. These statistics guide model selection based on parsimony, fit, and the goal
of the analysis. The Bayesian Information Criterion is the most used measure for
parsimony of model fit; however, improvements in log-likelihood ratios have also
been used to guide model choice in the political science literature (Oser, Hooghe
and Marien, 2013).
LCA can then be extended to what is sometimes called Latent Class Regres-
sion or more accurately termed LCA with concomitant variables. This means
that variables not included in the measurement model can be used to explain
membership in the various classes. Effectively, this allows individuals prior prob-
ability of latent class membership to vary by observed characteristics. This model
can either be estimated simultaneously or through a three-step process. It should
not be estimated in a two-step, classify and analyze approach, where individu-
als are assigned to classes and then a multinomial logistic regression is run; this
results in biased parameter and standard error estimates and therefore incorrect
inference (Kamata et al., 2018). Early research suggested the three-step process
faced similar estimation problems (Bolck, Croon and Hagenaars, 2004); however,
recent research suggests the three-step method can result in unbiased estimators
(Vermunt, 2010). They describe when a three-step approach may be preferred
over a one-step. In particular, studies with larges sets of covariates or more ex-
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ploratory studies may prefer a 3-step estimation procedure; however, one-step
procedures are typically simpler to implement. Given this study is descriptive
and with a relatively small set of covariates, I use the simultaneous (one-step)
estimation method.
2.4 Findings
Because I am interested in the patterns of these information sources, as opposed
to correlations between each source in isolation, I apply LCA as described before.
In order to do so, I first I have to determine the number of latent classes that
adequately describe the sample of data. One way of assessing model fit is com-
paring LCA estimations to a one-class model, increasing the number of classes
by one each time. In this manner, BIC is the most commonly used statistic for
identifying appropriate solutions, and a smaller BIC indicates better model fit1.
However, another approach that complements the use of a BIC statistic is to
assess the percent reduction of the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic G-squared
in comparison to the one-cluster model (Magidson and Vermunt 2004, for this
approach in political science see Oser, Hooghe and Marien 2013). Table 2.1 lists
the LCA model fit statistics for the analysis.
The BIC decreases up to the four-class model and then increases again for the
five class model. Additionally, changes in the log-likelihood ratio suggest a three
or four-class model may be preferable to more complex solutions. Comparing
results across the three-, four-, and five- cluster models, I choose to report results
for the four-class model for multiple reasons. First, of the three models it has
1Model fit cannot be determined using the more familiar chi-square distribution for comput-
ing the p value since data are sparse. There are 69 or over 10 million, possible combinations. So,
information criteria like the Bayesian information criterion provide goodness-of-fit indicators
that take both model fit and parsimony into account.
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Table 2.1: Model Fit Statistics
Number of classes BIC G-squared % change G-squared
1-class 45611 21515
2-class 44898 20650 -4.0
3-class 44659 20149 -6.4
4-class 44647 19887 -7.6
5-class 44749 19664 -8.7
the lowest BIC. Second, the results of the five and three-cluster models generally
mirror the four-cluster model but do not minimize BIC. Figure 2.22 presents a
summary of the class outputs from the four-class solution. The y-axis represents
the average for each indicator on the one to six point scale. Each bar represents
the average for a respective indicator for the each class which are grouped on the
x-axis. This visualization helps represent the absolute patterns of source usage
by class and helps identify possible ways of naming these classes.
Figure 2.2: Absolute weather information use patterns by class
2These patterns are remarkably robust across waves. Similar analyses were conducted for
waves 3 through 7 with almost identical patterns. The four class solution also looks remarkably
similar when applied to the full panel data.
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Another potentially useful visualization of this method is presented in Fig-
ure 2.3. This figure combines the previous two figures to graph the difference
between class averages and overall averages on the x-axis. The estimated pro-
portion of the sample in the class is in parentheses next to the class name in
the legend. Each grouping of responses compares, for each information source,
the class to the sample average. While the absolute values for each indicator are
somewhat obscured by this visualization, it provides a better understanding of
the relative differences between the different classes, by grouping the indicators
and comparing each to a baseline.
Figure 2.3: Relative weather information use patterns by class
The LCA identified four-clusters as described above, with the two middle
classifications being relatively similar. These results illustrate a number of inter-
esting patterns. First, we see that the sample is broken down into three relatively
similarly sized classes and one smaller class, instead of being dominated by one
class in particular. The first class that results from this analysis is the “Informal
Source” Class, henceforth also known as the IS-class. This group of respondents
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accounts for approximately 26% of the sample and has relatively low usage of
weather information except for informal sources from their social networks such
as family and friends and social media. This is especially apparent when looking
at the absolute values in Figure 2.2. Even for local television, the most popular
and formal source on average, IS-class members report much lower usage. “Tradi-
tional Media Users”, henceforth also known as TM-class members or TM-users,
account for a slightly larger percentage of respondents at almost 30%. These
users are characterized by their predominant reliance on local television in an
absolute sense. The next class is “Website Users” and accounts for the largest
percentage of respondents. This class has a similar pattern of weather informa-
tion usage as the TM-class but has a more diversified set of information sources,
with particular regards to websites. If we determine classes based on second-most
used sources, this class uses “other websites” second most frequently after local
television. The TM-class users use cable TV second most frequently after local
television. Finally, I identify a class which is highly engaged with weather infor-
mation, with many sources being used several times a week or more. This class
accounts for the smallest percentage of the sample at approximately 13%3.
Examining Figure 2.3, we see that comparing class means to the overall sample
mean, or effectively a one-class solution, further illuminates these patterns and
class names. For the “Highly Engaged” user, it is clear that they rely on each
weather information more than the average respondent. The patterns for web
and TM-users also become more apparent. For TM-users, we see that the only
sources which are used more than average are newspapers, local television, and
cable television. These individuals also are much less likely to use website sources
3This finding of the “Highly Engaged” class and its prevalence is particularly robust across
waves with between 12 and 14 percent of respondents being highly engaged with weather
information.
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than average. For Website Users on the other hand, these three sources are also
used more than average as are both other websites and government websites.
Finally, the IS-class members have the largest negative deviations from the overall
sample averages for multiple sources. They do, also, have slight preferences for
informal weather information sources such as family and friends and social media.
Interestingly, they also rely slightly more than average on phone apps. Another
possible interpretation of this class, as opposed to “Informal Source Users”, is
“Less Engaged Users” as Figure 2.2 suggests low bars for many sources and
Figure 2.3 suggests the larger negative deviations for a number of sources.
Another important element of measuring these types of patterns is stability
in the patterns themselves and in their classification of individuals. Therefore, I
reproduce these analyses using 1,671 respondents from a wave collected exactly
one year earlier, wave 14. I use this wave to hold the season of data reference
and collection constant, in case seasonal differences in weather are driving usage
patterns4. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 reproduce the visual representations of the same
analyses from Wave 18.
When examining these figures, we see that the absolute patterns are especially
stable across time periods. Some slight changes in the relative patterns arise,
primarily driven by differences in the overall sample means. Using these two
analyses, I can then measure if individuals remain in the same class across the two
waves. This helps me answer the question of if individuals weather information
use patterns are stable. I find that 68.3% of individuals are classified in the
same class and therefore use the same pattern across time. At least one factor
biases these results downwards which is that I used slightly different samples
across both estimations. Using the exact same sample would provide a more
4Oklahoma has most severe weather in spring so this may be especially relevant in this case.
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Figure 2.4: Absolute weather information use patterns by class
accurate estimate of any changes in patterns across time. The models in wave
18 relied on 1,619 responses while those in wave 14 relied on 1,671. However,
across these two samples there were only 1,194 respondents in both. Given the
data intensive nature of estimating these models, the strategy employed is not
without its merit. Despite this limitation, these findings still strongly suggest
that weather information source usage patterns are stable over time, at least for
those individuals who are consistently present in the panel data.
Next I examine what demographic and other individual level factors exter-
nal to the measurement model help explain classification within that model
through the use of concomitant variables. In this analysis, I examine how socio-
demographic variables including political dispositions help explain the patterns
of weather information usage described previously in the results section.
Table 2.2 displays the estimated generalized logit coefficients from the si-
multaneous LCA with concomitant variables models. From this table, we can
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Figure 2.5: Relative weather information use patterns by class
interpret sign and significance. Table 2.2 suggests age is consistently related to
an increased likelihood of belonging to all classes relative to the IS-class espe-
cially for ”Traditional Media” users. Similarly, males are more likely to belong to
each class other than the IS-class. Ideology has a limited relationship with class
membership, though more conservative individuals are less likely to belong to the
“Website User” class. Being a racial minority, in particular African American,
is positively associated with being any class other than the IS-class. These rela-
tionships are especially strong for being a TM-user or a “Highly Engaged” user.
Education is negatively associated with class membership as either a TM-user or
“Highly Engaged” user, relative to the “Informal Source” user class.
Figure 2.6 represents the predicted probability for class membership for all
four classes, across the range of data, with all other variables held at their mean
or mode5. For “Informal Source users” and “Traditional Media users”, diverging
5Findings for age are robust to various subsamples of the overall panel data including wave
samples and overall samples.
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Table 2.2: Generalized Multinomial Logit Coefficients for the External Determi-
nants of Weather Information User Types
Traditional Media User Website User Highly Engaged User
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Age 0.17*** 0.015 0.14*** 0.017 0.064*** 0.012
Male 0.68** 0.27 1.3*** 0.28 0.33 0.28
Ideology -0.063 0.094 -0.18* 0.104 -0.041 0.095
Democrat 0.64* 0.34 0.27 0.38 0.47 0.34
Some College -0.31 0.39 0.39 0.47 -0.21 0.39
Bachelors Degree -1.10*** 0.41 0.32 0.47 -0.96** 0.40
Graduate School -1.29*** 0.43 0.33 0.49 -1.38*** 0.46
African American 3.20** 1.31 2.76** 1.33 2.91** 1.22
Native American -0.095 0.61 -0.58 0.64 0.33 0.47
Other Race 0.36 0.65 0.15 0.69 0.57 0.53
Constant -9.80*** 1.07 -7.83*** 1.20 -3.61*** 0.80
* p-value <0.10, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01. Reference class is IS-class.
Partisan reference category is Republicans. Education reference category is no college.
Race reference category is white. Total n = 1,619.
patterns emerge. As respondents increase in age, their probability of member-
ship in the “Informal Source user” class decreases while their probability in the
“Traditional Media user” class increases. Older individuals are less likely to use
social media, in general, and therefore are less likely to use it to access weather
information. For the other two classes, the relationships are somewhat more com-
plex. The predicted probability of being in these classes increase up to a point
and then decrease. However, where this point occurs differs for each class. For
the “highly engaged” class, we see the youngest point of inflection, at about 57.
These individuals have a predicted probability of approximately 0.15, similar to
their predicted probability of being in the “Website User” class. The distribution
of predicted probabilities for the “Highly Engaged” class is concentrated around
the younger half of the distribution. On the other hand, the Web-user class has its
highest predicted probability, of approximately 0.43 at 75 years old. Compared
to the “Highly Engaged” class, which has relatively symmetrical distribution, the
“Website User” class has a thick right tail suggesting older respondents are more
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Figure 2.6: Predicted probabilities across all ages for each class
likely to belong to this class.
Being female is positively associated with membership in the “Website User”
class as demonstrated in Figure 2.7. Being female is associated with an approxi-
mately 50% increase in predicted probability for membership. Males, on the other
hand, are much more likely to be a member of the “Informal Source User” class,






































Informal Source Users Traditional Media Users Website Users Highly Engaged Users
Female
Male
Figure 2.7: Predicted probabilities across gender for each class
more likely to be a member than females. These results in conjunction suggest
males are much more likely to rely on their family and friends and social media
for weather information. They also suggest females are also more likely to rely on
websites than their male counterparts. Gender has a negligible role in explaining
class membership in both the “Highly Engaged” class and the “Traditional Media
User” class.
Relatively clear patterns also emerge when examining education, as demon-
strated in Figure 2.8. For the “Highly Engaged” class, the predicted probability
of membership decreases as education increases; this pattern is also present for
the predicted probability of membership in the “Traditional Media Eser” class.
Membership in the “Traditional media Eser” class is most strongly related to
education as the wide spread of the dots in Figure 2.8 suggest. Individuals with

















































Figure 2.8: Predicted probabilities across education categories for each class
user” class than individuals of all other education levels. In fact, individuals with
only a high school education are over twice as likely to be a traditional media
user (0.32) as individuals with either a bachelors (0.15) or graduate degree (0.15).
The reverse pattern is apparent for the “IS-user” and “Website User” classes; as
education increases, so does the predicted probability of membership in these
classes. This relationship is especially strong for membership in the “Website
User” class with those having a graduate degree having a predicted probabil-
ity of membership of 0.33 while those with only a high school education have a
predicted probability of 0.14. Education has a slightly weaker relationship with
membership in both the “Informal Source” class and “Highly Engaged” class, in
particular.
Finally, race is associated with class membership in a number of important
ways as evidenced by Figure 2.9. White respondents have the highest predicted
probability for belonging to the “Informal Source User” class. Native American


















































Figure 2.9: Predicted probabilities across race categories for each class
Engaged” class. African American individuals have the highest predicted proba-
bility of belonging to the “Traditional Media” class as well as the “Website User”
class. In some cases, the differences in predicted probability for class membership
are quite large. The predicted probability for White respondents for the “Tradi-
tional Media User” class is approximately 0.31, compared to African Americans
who are approximately 40% more likely to belong to the class with a predicted
probability of 0.51. Native Americans are approximately half as likely (0.07) to
belong to the “Website User” class relative to all other racial groups (between
0.12 and 0.15). Native Americans, African Americans, and members of other
races have predicted probabilities of membership in the “Highly Engaged” user
class that are approximately 1.3 times the predicted probabilities of their white
counterparts. Finally, the strongest relationship between race and class mem-
bership is for “Informal Source” users. African American respondents have a
predicted probability of 0.02 of belonging in this class while White respondents
have a predicted probability almost fifteen times as high at 0.28.
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Figure 2.10: Predicted probabilities across ideology for each class
Finally, I examine the relationship between ideology and weather information
source patterns visually in Figure 2.10. This figure suggests that ideology has
limited association or relationship with membership in the “Traditional Media”
and “Highly Engaged” user classes. On the other hand, we see diverging patterns
for the “Website User” and “Informal Source User” classes. As individuals be-
come more conservative, they are more likely to belong to the “Informal Source
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User” class and less likely to belong to the “Website User” class. The slope is
slightly stronger for “Website Users” as the most liberal individual (ideology =
1) has a predicted probability of approximately 0.42 while the most conservative
individual (ideology = 7) has a predicted probability of approximately 50% less
or 0.21. For the “Informal Source” class, this difference across the scale is an
increase or slope of 1.5, from 0.31 to 0.47, as opposed to the negative slope of
approximately 2 for “Website Users” on ideology.
2.5 Discussion
First, this study sought to examine patterns of weather information usage among
Oklahomans. In particular, given a rich information environment, I asked can
individuals be grouped based on their usage of various sources in conjunction.
I find that in general distinct groups of weather information usage do emerge.
In particular, I find a few important patterns of usage that deviate from the
average pattern of usage across all sources of information. The largest group of
individuals are classified as users of weather information found on websites, this
category accounts for just over thirty percent of respondents. Other important
patterns of usage emphasize other types of sources. The second largest group of
individuals use a pattern of information weather usage that relies primarily on
traditional weather media such as local television. The next largest group relies
on their social network and informal sources such as family and friends as well as
social media. Finally, a small group of individuals, less than 13% of the sample,
are highly engaged with weather information sources regardless of type. Having
established these four different patterns of weather information access, this study
then examines who uses these patterns and belongs to these classes.
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In examining how external characteristics are associated with weather infor-
mation usage, I find that demographics are more strongly associated with weather
information access patterns than political characteristics. Ideology is weakly as-
sociated with membership in two of the four classes. A relatively small but
interesting diverging pattern with conservative ideology being negatively asso-
ciated with membership in the “Website Users” class and positively associated
with membership in the “Informal Source” users class. Ideology is related to a
formality divide moreso than a digital divide. Given conservatives lack of trust
in authorities and government, generally, these findings suggests these attitudes
transfer over to weather information sources as well (Rudolph and Evans, 2005;
Rudolph, 2009; Jones, 2004). Gender, on the other hand, is more strongly asso-
ciated with class membership. Females are much more likely to rely on a variety
of sources as opposed to males who are especially likely to rely on their net-
work when accessing weather information. Males, however, are more likely to
be highly engaged across all sources. Additionally, as females are generally more
likely to have higher risk perceptions (Finucane et al., 2000; McCright and Dun-
lap, 2011a), these findings may suggest one way they address these risks, and
their higher perceptions thereof, is to seek out more information, particularly on
websites and through other formal informational channels.
Race and education play an especially important role in understanding weather
information access patterns. Highly educated respondents are much more likely
to rely on their immediate networks, including through social media, or use other
internet sources such as websites. Less educated individuals, on the other hand,
are much more likely to rely on traditional media, including local televisions, for
weather information. They are also slightly more likely to be highly engaged
across a wide variety of sources. These results suggest that the digital divide is
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present for weather information, given that lower education is associated with a
lower likelihood of using social media and websites. In addition to social media,
less educated individuals are less likely to use informal sources such as their fam-
ily and friends. Educated individuals may rely on their family and friends for
weather information because their network is also highly educated. This may also
explain why more highly educated individuals are less likely to be “Highly En-
gaged Users”. They may view their network resources as sufficient in educating
them about the weather. With the digital divide, less educated individuals are
forced to rely on the television for their weather information. In weather, tele-
vision can be a reliable source of information; however, broadcast meteorologists
are more prescriptive than other sources and may give incorrect advice (Ryan,
1982; Compton, 2018).
The digital divide is also present when examining how race is associated with
weather information patterns. As with less educated respondents, Racial minori-
ties, African Americans in particular, are more likely to rely on traditional media
for weather information or be highly engaged across media. White respondents,
on the other hand, are much more reliant on informal sources of weather in-
formation such as their social networks than their racial minority counterparts.
Age is also highly related to the digital divide and associated information source
patterns. In particular, older individuals are much more likely to rely on us-
ing traditional media sources while avoiding informal and social network sources
such as family and friends and social media. Younger individuals, on the other
hand, are much more likely to use these informal and sometimes online weather
information search patterns.
These results have important implications for understanding who has access
to weather information and how reliable that information is. Additionally, re-
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search has suggested that the use of multiple sources, at least during hazards,
can help promote appropriate responses (Miran, Ling and Rothfusz, 2018). Thus,
finding that vulnerable populations, such as racial minorities and the elderly, pri-
marily rely on one set of sources, traditional ones such as local television, for
weather information may be potentially problematic. These individuals may be
less attuned to weather risks given their limited attention to information about
the phenomenon. However, less educated individuals, another vulnerable group,
are more likely to be highly engaged across the set of information sources which
may reflect a protective behavior. Interestingly, these results suggest the oppo-
site relationship than one might expect with the increase of leisure time to seek
out a variety of weather information sources that usually comes with increased
education. Rather, education is associated with increased use of trusted informal
sources such as social networks for routine weather information gathering. In the
next chapter, I intend to examine the relationships between these weather infor-
mation source patterns and climate change beliefs (See Goebbert et al. (2012)
for a related analysis). To do so, I intend to use the outputs of these models, the
class memberships and predicted probabilities, as explanations for beliefs about





the News, and Global Warming
Information Sources
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I reviewed research on the use of information during
severe weather to inform the use of weather information during day-to-day life. I
then estimated patterns or classes of this usage and the demographic factors and
political dispositions that help explain use of those patterns. In this chapter, I
extend these analyses by using those demographic factors, political dispositions,
and the weather information sources and patterns to help explain beliefs about
climate change.
In particular, I focus on these elements because information is a valuable but
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increasingly abundant resource in modern society. The number of information
sources has grown tremendously with the proliferation of television during the
middle of the century and the advent and growth of the internet in the past few
decades (Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2008). Not only have the number of sources of infor-
mation increased but so have the duties of those various channels of information.
Most information outlets including cable TV networks, newspapers, and social
media websites disseminate information on a wide variety of topics ranging from
the daily forecast to updates on current political events to coverage of popular
culture.
These roles of information providers may vary over time and across the vary-
ing topics they present. Similarly, the public’s usage of these information outlets
may vary with respect to the content of the information they seek (Stroud, 2011).
While various sources may all produce weather and political information, indi-
viduals may choose a particular subset for each different information type. These
subsets of sources for particular information sources may range in their degrees
of overlap, from entirely to not at all. However, the existence of these overlaps
has rarely been examined nor have the implications of these overlaps for policy
beliefs. One reason for this may be that only certain policy areas, those which
are highly conflictual and affect large populations, are reasonably covered by such
widely varying sources of information. While areas such as education and health-
care also receive significant information coverage from a variety of sources, many
of these policy problems are more likely to be addressed at a local level. Policy
areas such as gun control or climate change, in particular, affect a much broader
swath of individuals. As such, a much wider variety of information sources for
these areas may exist.
Climate change as a concept appears in news media information as well as
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weather information such as forecasts (Carvalho, 2007; Boykoff, 2008; Feldman
et al., 2012). Additionally, individuals may seek out information dedicated to
climate change or global warming in particular (Wood and Vedlitz, 2007). Given
these three potential categories of information sources, I am interested in how each
is related to certainty in beliefs in the human-caused nature of climate change. In
particular, I am interested in the overlap between news sources, weather sources,
and climate specific sources. I am interested in examining how the context or
category of a particular information source may change the relationship of that
source with climate change beliefs. In the following paper, I first review the extant
literature on information sources and climate change. I then introduce the data,
one particular wave (18) of the M-SISNet panel survey used elsewhere in this
dissertation, I use to examine these relationships and their potential contextual
contingencies. Using these data, I model the relationship between a variety of
information sources, in multiple contexts, and climate change beliefs. Finally, I
end with the implications of this research for future studies and potential policy
implications.
3.2 Literature Review
Within communications and political science, many studies of climate change
beliefs have focused on the Receive Accept Sample (RAS) Model of public opinion
(Zaller, 1992). Zaller argues that survey responses, and therefore public opinion,
are the product of the available thoughts or ideas in an individuals head at a
given time. These ideas are then accepted if they are consistent with prior beliefs
and applied or sampled based on their saliency. These thoughts are unstable and
highly subject to influence by political and media elites. Individuals lack strongly
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held attitudes or beliefs about most political or policy issues because these issues
are generally peripheral to their everyday lives. Survey responses, and the beliefs
they represent, are subject to the most recent information an individual has
consumed on the topic. The effects of this information, then, is highly contingent
upon the ideological nature of the media itself and its corresponding audience
(Feldman, Hart and Milosevic, 2017).
3.2.1 News Sources and Climate Change Beliefs
With regard to climate change, research has demonstrated that the messaging
from elites and media sources is highly varied. Scholars have found that certain
sources such as Fox News and the Wall Street Journal are less likely to view
climate change as a problem (Feldman et al., 2012). Liberal media outlets such
as CNN are more likely to present climate change as a problem with human roots.
Regarding political elites such as elected officials, this relationship is maintained
with Democrats being more consistent in their depictions of climate change than
Republicans (Merkley and Stecula, 2018). Conservative news outlets have also
been documented actively spreading doubt about the reality of climate change,
its causes, and the science upon which out understanding of climate change is
built (Dunlap and McCright, 2011; Feldman et al., 2012). In particular, these
news sources portray the scientific consensus on climate change differently, with
liberal media sources reflecting the consensus a vast majority of the time while
conservative sources reflect the consensus less than half of the time (Boykoff
and Boykoff, 2004, 2007). These studies correspond with a decrease in trust in
scientists among political conservatives, especially with regards to climate change
(Gauchat, 2012; Leiserowitz et al., 2010; Krosnick and MacInnis, 2010).
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These information sources, which are already predisposed to confirming indi-
viduals’ prior beliefs, are then processed in a motivated manner, further amplify-
ing the original beliefs. This amplification of original belief then leads to increased
usage of the news media that confirmed the belief, creating an entrenched feed-
back loop (Feldman et al., 2014). These feedback loops are especially apparent in
the context of political ideology and partisanship. While many argue party iden-
tification has the strongest influence on climate change beliefs (Carmichael and
Brulle, 2018), this identity is also associated with a set of news media sources.
Thus, partisanship creates and reinforces a media environment that further re-
inforces partisan belief systems. Cultural cognition, as separate from ideology,
has also been demonstrated as an important explanation for climate change be-
liefs across a variety of studies (Hornsey et al., 2016). Recently, scholars have
suggested that selective exposure and processing, prominently explored among
ideologues, is also present for differing cultural types (Newman, Nisbet and Nis-
bet, 2018). This creates a self-reinforcing mechanism wherein media sources
produce content which is in line with their audiences predispositions in order to
maintain that audience (Stroud, 2008, 2011). This results in intense competition
for information provision and the creation of “niche news” for increasingly small
segments of the population. Others have argued this niche news phenomenon
could lead to a competitive market for information and ideas where the “best”
win out (Stromer-Galley, 2003); however, most argue this provision of niche news
actually leads to individuals being exposed to a more narrow set of ideas, even
cutting themselves off from news entirely (Prior, 2007; Sunstein, 2009).
In Zaller’s RAS model of public opinion, the processes of selective exposure
to particular media sources affects the set of information in the individual has re-
ceived. Moving beyond this information environment, individuals then accept the
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relevant information and process it. One mechanism through which selected infor-
mation processing occurs is motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge,
2006). Scholars in this tradition find that motivated reasoning wherein individu-
als selectively process information that confirms their beliefs and strongly argue
against disconfirming evidence is most prevalent among respondents with strong
partisan affiliation, high attention to politics, and more issue specific knowledge
(Zaller, 1992; Lodge and Taber, 2013). A somewhat separate tradition of pub-
lic opinion argues that individual attitudes and beliefs, reflected through survey
questions, are a more stable and structured concept (see Jones and Jenkins-Smith
(2009) for a brief overview of the different traditions). Despite these differences,
both groups of scholars suggest that political ideologies, cultural beliefs, and cog-
nitive shortcuts such as motivated reasoning help explain public beliefs about
politics and policy, in particular those regarding climate change.
This body of research suggests, as Carmichael and Brulle (2018) and others
argue, that climate change beliefs are a product of both social psychological deter-
minants and media exposure. Within the context of climate change, research has
demonstrated a particularly strong interaction between media/information and
social identities such as partisanship. One area the relationship between informa-
tion and partisanship is particularly stark is in framing studies comparing climate
change to global warming. Results of these studies have found, consistently over
time and across samples, that Republicans, on average, report lower levels of be-
lief and concern for global warming relative to climate change (Schuldt and Roh,
2014a; Schuldt, Roh and Schwarz, 2015; Schuldt and Roh, 2014b). Additionally,
these studies suggest that Republican respondents’ beliefs about climate change
and global warming are conceptually distinct and that beliefs about global warm-
ing are more susceptible to temperature related primes. Democrats, on the other
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hand, associate both climate change and global warming with similar concepts
and their opinions do not vary with temperature primes.
Not all frames affect reported beliefs in the same manner, however. In some
cases, both liberals and conservatives will adapt their beliefs in ways contrary
to the science being presented to them (Nisbet, Cooper and Garrett, 2015). In
most cases, though, scholars find boomerang effects in Republican respondents in
which attempts to increase belief in climate change actually entrench skepticism
or denial of climate change or support for mitigation policies (Zhou, 2016; Hart
and Nisbet, 2012). Republicans engage in motivated reasoning by assimilating
information which fits their priors and disconfirming information which does not.
However, some cues are stronger than others; for example, cold primes or tem-
peratures only affect beliefs about global warming, not climate change, and only
among climate change skeptics (Schuldt and Roh, 2014b). News media, however,
can have a strong effect on climate change beliefs. Feldman et al (2012) find
that where Republicans get their news from is much more influential on their
climate change beliefs than where Democrats get their news from. This is true
even for Republicans who get news from climate change affirming sources such as
MSNBC and CNN. This research suggests Republicans are particularly sensitive
to informational effects, at least regarding climate change.
3.2.2 By-product Learning and Weather Information
These studies are primarily interested in the relationship between individuals
everyday lives and news consumption and climate change beliefs. The information
individuals consume regarding climate change is either acquired in the process
of acquiring more general news (Hmielowski et al., 2014; Feldman et al., 2012;
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Carmichael and Brulle, 2018) or simply through the weather they experience
(Schuldt and Roh, 2014b) rather than through seeking out information on climate
change specifically. Thus, these studies suggest by-product learning about climate
change is occurring, as opposed to direct learning. By-product learning is the
idea that individuals learn about one political concept through unrelated, usually
routine activities. In these studies, individuals beliefs about climate change are
learned or informed by the general news sources individuals use as well as the
weather they experience. This body of research prompts a set of hypotheses
regarding news sources listed below:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who use conservative news sources, such as Fox
News or the Wall Street Journal, will be more likely to believe humans are not
causing global climate change and more certain in that belief.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who use more liberal news sources, such as CNN or
NPR, will be more likely to believe, and more certain in the belief, that humans
are causing climate change.
Moving beyond these hypotheses regarding relationships between traditional
news media and climate change beliefs, by-product learning may occur through
the use of weather-information, especially given the well documented relationship
between weather and climate change beliefs (Egan and Mullin, 2012; Hornsey
et al., 2016). Just as individuals learn about climate change through the weather
they experience, they may also learn about climate change through the informa-
tion they consume about that weather. This represents another, yet unexplored,
pathway through which by-product learning about climate change may take place.
Some research has investigated the effects of training broadcast meteorologists
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in climate change communication. Using a field experiment and two-wave panel
design, Zhao et al. (2014) find that respondents who viewed the climate change
segments became more likely to believe in science supported beliefs about cli-
mate change. Meteorologists who took part in the Climate Matters program
elsewhere were much more likely to report on climate change than their col-
leagues (Perkins IV et al., 2018). These meteorologists perceive their role as
“station scientists” and not just to report the weather forecasts. McIlroy-Young
and Thistlethwaite (2019) also find that climate change communication behaviors
vary across meteorologists in Canada.
However, even meteorologists attitudes towards climate change vary; Maibach,
Witte and Wilson (2011) find that the “Climategate” scandal decreased broad-
cast meteorologists’ belief that climate change is occurring. Additionally, Mel-
drum et al. (2016) find that meteorologists differ in their knowledge of climate
change and their ability to communicate climate information effectively. The
meteorologists they interviewed perceived images as an effective climate change
communication tool. These studies illustrate the limits on climate change and
climate information communication that broadcast meteorologists face. Wilson
(2009) emphasizes the obstacles including differences among broadcast meteorol-
ogists values, limited time on-air, as well as a preference for discussing climate
change off-air through blogs and other media. These studies suggest weather
information, and broadcast meteorology in particular, may be valuable resources
for changing climate change beliefs. Therefore, I arrive at the following research
question:
Research Question 1: How are weather information sources associated with
belief and certainty in that belief in the human (or not) causes of global climate
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change?
3.2.3 Direct Learning through Global Warming Informa-
tion
Most of the research described in the previous sections asks respondents to re-
port their general news consumption habits. They then examine the relationship
between these sources and various climate change beliefs (Carmichael and Brulle,
2018; Feldman et al., 2014). Similarly, weather information, in particular through
broadcast meteorologists, can be a valuable source of information about climate
change (Placky et al., 2016). These categories of information are relevant to un-
derstanding individual’s climate change beliefs, especially in light of the effects
of partisanship and other values. These studies, primarily, rely on an implicit
connection between the information and climate change beliefs, thus describing
a process of by-product or indirect learning. On the other hand, individuals may
directly seek out information about climate change in an effort to understand the
issue. Studies which examine the more explicit and direct relationship between in-
formation seeking behaviors about climate change and climate change beliefs are
less prevalent. In fact, Marquart-Pyatt et al. (2011) state that “We need to know
more about where members of the public get their information about climate sci-
ence and how they assess the trustworthiness of these sources.”(Marquart-Pyatt
et al., 2011, p. 40). Thus, I ask the following research question:
Research Question 2: What information sources do people report accessing for
global warming information
Scholars of the Risk Information Seeking and Processing model have docu-
mented generic information seeking behaviors, agnostic to the specific sources,
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across many specific domains (Yang, Aloe and Feeley, 2014). In the climate
change domain, Kahlor (2007) finds that individuals on average report high in-
tentions to seek out information about global warming. They also find that the
average respondent reports slight information insufficiency which drives their in-
tended information seeking behaviors. Digging into more specific information
sources, Wood and Vedlitz (2007) use an open ended question on a phone survey
that asked respondents to list information sources for a number of issues, includ-
ing global warming. They argue that a higher number of information sources,
which for their data ranged from zero to seven, is associated with more informa-
tion and therefore a more accurate view of the issue, relying less on individual
predispositions such as partisanship. However, they do not find a relationship
between number of listed information sources and beliefs about climate change.
Attention, operationalized as thinking about the issue, to climate change, how-
ever, is positively associated with concern for global warming. Believing science
is unclear, a belief about a potential information source, is negatively associated
with concern for global warming. On the other hand, Kellstedt, Zahran and
Vedlitz (2008) find that confidence in scientists is negatively associated with con-
cern for global warming. They also find that more informed respondents, those
with knowledge about climate change, are less concerned about climate change,
in contrast to the findings in Wood and Vedlitz (2007). These findings suggest a
complex relationship between actual climate knowledge, information, and beliefs.
In this chapter, I test a hypothesis based off Wood and Vedlitz (2007) presented
below:
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who use more information sources specifically about
global warming will be more likely to believe that global climate change is
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caused by humans and more confident in that belief.
Hypothesis 4: Individuals who seek out conservative sources for global
warming information, specifically, will be less likely to believe humans are
causing climate change and more confident in that belief.
Hypothesis 5: Individuals who seek out liberal sources for global warming
information, specifically, will be more likely to believe humans are causing
climate change and more confident in that belief.
3.3 Data and Methods
The data for this chapter come from the single wave of the M-SISNet panel survey
used throughout this dissertation. Specifically, this chapter relies on data from
wave 18 of the panel. This wave was fielded between June 4th and July 23rd
in 2018. The total number of respondents is 2,246 and the median completion
time is 33 minutes. For this chapter, this wave is used because it includes the
usual battery of information questions and two unique batteries of information
questions which were not asked previously.
The battery of questions used for the analysis in Chapter One asked: ”How
frequently do you get information about the WEATHER from each of the follow-
ing sources?”. The response options were:
• Newspapers
• Non-government Internet websites (such as weather.com)
• Government sponsored Internet websites (such as noaa.gov, Oklahoma Mesonet)
• Local TV (television) news
76
• Cable TV (television) news (such as The Weather Channel)
• Radio
• Family, friends, or colleagues
• Social Media, such as Facebook and Twitter
• Cell phone applications or automated text message
• Other (please specify)
Individuals were able to choose various options for each of these sources:
• Several times a day (5)
• About once a day (4)
• Several times per week (3)
• About once per week (2)
• Less than once per week (1)
• Never (0)
The question used regarding news sources was very similar to the one used
for weather information. The question asked, “Now we would like to know about
your GENERAL NEWS HABITS. About how frequently do you get information
about current news events from the following sources:”. Response options were





• The New York Times
• The Oklahoman
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• The Tulsa World
• The Wall Street Journal
• Local Television Stations (such as ABC, NBC, or CBS)
• Public Radio Stations (such as NPR)
We also included an option for respondents to list other sources of general
news information not listed in the response options. Finally, we asked individu-
als about their use of information of global warming specifically. This question
asked, “People get information about global warming in a number of ways. For
example, some people talk to friends. Others go online or watch the news. Where
would you say you get most of your information about global warming? Please
provide as much detail as possible, such as the name of the website or news pub-
lication.” This question relied entirely on respondents self-reporting their sources
of global warming information in an open-ended manner. I use key-word analy-
sis from this question to create independent variables for the analysis of climate
change beliefs1. We also asked a standard battery of demographic and political
questions which will be included as covariates in the regression models. To model
climate change beliefs, I first use a dependent variable which is constructed by
combining both an individual’s belief in the causes of climate change and their
certainty in that belief. This scale ranges from negative ten, which represents ex-
treme certainty that climate change is not human caused, to positive ten, which
represents extreme certainty that climate change is human caused. I model this
belief in a series of two-step linear regressions where in the first step I include
one category of information source. In the second step, I add demographic and
1I attempted to code responses into categories; while certain themes did emerge, most
responses ended up in general, generic categories. Using key-words allows for more specificity
among source identification.
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political covariates which have been demonstrated to be related to climate change
beliefs. Finally, I model climate change beliefs as a function of the three cate-
gories of information in conjunction with each other. All models were tested for
heteroskedasticity in the residuals using the Breusch Pagan test; the null hypoth-
esis was rejected for all models, therefore I report robust standard errors for each.
I also checked Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all models to assess multi-
collinearity. All VIFs were less than 5; therefore, no serious collinearity problems
were found. Slightly high VIFs (ranging between 2.5 and 3.5) were present for
party identification which is to be expected due to the inclusion of ideology as
well as party. The results from these models are presented below.
3.4 Findings
The summary statistics for the subset of the sample of individuals who have com-
plete responses to all variables used in these analyses from wave eighteen of the
MSIS-Net survey are presented below in Table 3.1. The mean for the dependent
variable, Certainty in (Non)Belief in Climate Change, is 1.6. For all respon-
dents in this sample, the average belief leans slightly toward climate change is
happening and caused by human activity. However, there is large variation in
these beliefs for the sample, ranging the entire possible scale of the variable from
negative 10, very certain climate change is not caused by the emissions of green-
house gases, to positive 10 very certain it is caused by greenhouse gas emissions,
with the mid-point of zero representing no certainty, in either belief. Next are
the summary statistics for the sources of weather information in our study. The
most common, as prior research including prior chapters in the dissertation would
suggest, is local television stations. This average of 3.6 represents use of local
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television stations approximately once a day. All other weather sources have
means between 1.03 for newspapers, to 2.23 for family and friends, suggesting
uses between less than once per week to about once per week. We see a similar
pattern for general news sources as well. Local television stations are used for
general news about once a day, mean = 3.52. All other news sources have a mean
between 0.27, for the Wall Street Journal, and 1.68 for Fox News, or between zero
uses per week to about once per week. Finally, examining demographics we see
that the model sample is relatively wealthy, older, well-educated, white, more
likely to be female, and more conservative.
The data in Table 3.1 account for all responses included in all of the following
models. While the survey was completed by approximately 2,300 individuals, I
use the subset of complete responses to be better able to compare across models,
since the exact same sample is used in each. Regarding the relationships posited
in hypotheses 1 and 2, the models in Table 3.2 present the first tests. In column
one I model climate change beliefs, (un)certainty in greenhouse gas emissions as
the cause, as a function of news sources. In column two, I add covariates common
to the study of climate change beliefs.
Table 3.2 provides general support for hypothesis 1 which stated that con-
servative news sources such as Fox News and the Wall Street Journal would be
associated with greater certainty in the belief climate change is not caused by
greenhouse gas emissions. Specifically, in both column 1 and column two, Fox
News and the Wall Street Journal have negative and significant coefficients. In
column one, the coefficient on the variable representing use of Fox as a news
source is the largest of the news source variables. This model, without covari-
ates, suggests a one point change on the Fox News variable is associated with an
approximately one point decrease in certainty that climate change is caused by
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Model Sample, n = 1,319
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
DV: Certainty in (Non)Belief in Climate Change 1.7 6.9 −10 10
Global Warming Info: Number of Sources 1.3 1 0 7
Weather Info: Cable TV 1.6 1.7 0 5
Weather Info: Social Media 1.1 1.7 0 5
Weather Info: Family/Friends 2.2 1.6 0 5
Weather Info: Radio 2.1 1.9 0 5
Weather Info: Local TV 3.7 1.5 0 5
Weather Info: Govt. Websites 1.2 1.5 0 5
Weather Info: Other Websites 1.9 1.8 0 5
Weather Info: Phone Apps 2.1 1.9 0 5
Weather Info: Newspapers 1.1 1.6 0 5
News Source: Fox 1.7 1.9 0 5
News Source: CNN 1.1 1.6 0 5
News Source: MSNBC 1.0 1.6 0 5
News Source: New York Times 0.38 0.99 0 5
News Source: The Oklahoman 0.95 1.5 0 5
News Source: Tulsa World 0.41 .0 0 5
News Source: Wall Street Journal 0.28 0.77 0 5
News Source: Local TV 3.6 1.5 0 5
News Source: NPR 1.1 1.6 0 5
Income 72,000 57,000 10,000 900,000
Male 0.43 0.5 0 1
Age 61.1 13.5 21 95
Ideology 4.6 1.7 1 7
Democrat 0.41 0.49 0 1
Some College 0.3 0.47 0 1
Bachelors Degree 0.29 0.45 0 1
Graduate Degree 0.26 0.43 0 1
African American 0.027 0.16 0 1
Native American 0.045 0.21 0 1
Other Race 0.041 0.19 0 1
Website User 0.31 0.37 0 0.999
Informal Source USer 0.26 0.37 0 1
Traditional Media User 0.29 0.4 0 1
Highly Engaged User 0.13 0.28 0 1
caused by greenhouse gas emissions (or the converse: a one point increase in the
certainty climate change is NOT caused by greenhouse gas emissions). Thus, if
an individual moves from never using Fox as a news source to even less than one
use per week, their certainty in their beliefs about climate change will change by
about 1 point on the 21 point scale. Local TV has a positive relationship with
climate change beliefs. This effect of local TV could be considered as evidence
in opposition to hypothesis one as many local television stations are owned by
relatively conservative corporations. Additionally, Oklahomans, and this sample
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Table 3.2: OLS Regression Coefficients for News Source Models
Certainty in (Non)Belief in Climate Change
(1) (2)
News Source: Fox −1.01∗∗∗ (0.09) −0.27∗∗∗ (0.09)
News Source: CNN 0.75∗∗∗ (0.12) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.11)
News Source: MSNBC 0.75∗∗∗ (0.12) 0.27∗∗ (0.11)
News Source: New York Times 0.77∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.18 (0.15)
News Source: The Oklahoman 0.08 (0.11) 0.17 (0.11)
News Source: Tulsa World 0.26 (0.16) 0.04 (0.15)
News Source: Wall Street Journal −0.59∗∗ (0.23) −0.40∗ (0.22)
News Source: Local TV 0.37∗∗∗ (0.11) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.10)





Logged Income −0.19 (0.24)
Some College −0.46 (0.50)
Bachelors Degree −0.57 (0.53)
Graduate Degree 0.40 (0.55)
African American −1.22 (1.01)
Native American −0.04 (0.80)
Other Race 0.59 (0.76)
Constant −0.42 (0.47) 7.76∗∗∗ (2.80)
N 1,319 1,319
R2 0.30 0.46
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.45
Residual Std. Error 5.83 (df = 1309) 5.14 (df = 1298)
F Statistic 63.10∗∗∗ (df = 9; 1309) 55.76∗∗∗ (df = 20; 1298)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. Robust std. errors in parentheses.
Reference categories are female, Republicans, HS or less, and White.
in particular, are on average conservative; therefore, one might expect local news
sources in the state to be conservative news sources.
Regarding hypothesis two, I also find support. Specifically, more liberal news
sources have positive coefficients, suggesting their use is associated with increased
belief in climate change being caused by greenhouse gas emissions. All sources,
other than the two previously described, present a positive relationship; however,
both local newspapers, The Tulsa World and The Oklahoman, and the New York
Times present null relationships with climate change beliefs, when accounting for
covariates. A one unit change in any of these sources is associated with an approx-
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imately 0.3 unit change in certainty of the causes climate change beliefs. Column
two of Table 3.2 suggests that hypotheses one and two are supported, even when
including potential individual level confounding factors such as ideology, parti-
sanship, and demographics. Use of the New York Times switches from a large
and positive effect to a null effect with the inclusion of covariates. Otherwise, the
relationships between these sources and certainty in the causes of climate change
are robust to the inclusion of covariates and similar across both models.
Having examined the relationships between news sources and climate change
beliefs, I move to examining how weather information sources are associated
with climate change beliefs. The models of the relationship between weather
information sources and certainty in beliefs about the causes of climate change are
presented in Table 3.3. In column one, only three sources of weather information
are significantly related to beliefs about the causes of climate change. Specifically,
social media and radio are associated with decreases in certainty in the belief that
climate change is caused by greenhouse gas emissions, or increases in certainty it
is not caused by greenhouse gas emissions. On the other hand, getting weather
information from family and friends is associated with increased certainty in the
belief that climate change is caused by the combustion of fossil fuels and the
subsequent greenhouse gas emissions.
In column two of Table 3.3, a slightly more nuanced set of relationships be-
tween weather information sources and climate change beliefs is presented. When
I account for covariates common to the study of climate change beliefs, the use
of cable television as a weather information source becomes significant at the ten
percent level. As researchers have extensively examined the relationship between
general news sources and climate change beliefs, more strict standards of statis-
tical significance should be adopted. However, in this more exploratory realm
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Table 3.3: OLS Regression Coefficients for Weather Information Models
Certainty in (Non)Belief in Climate Change
(1) (2)
Weather Info: Cable TV 0.08 (0.12) 0.16∗ (0.10)
Weather Info: Social Media −0.29∗∗ (0.12) −0.28∗∗∗ (0.10)
Weather Info: Family/Friends 0.46∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.23∗∗ (0.11)
Weather Info: Radio −0.29∗∗∗ (0.10) −0.15∗ (0.08)
Weather Info: Local TV 0.01 (0.14) 0.17 (0.11)
Weather Info: Govt. Websites 0.20 (0.14) 0.08 (0.11)
Weather Info: Other Websites −0.02 (0.12) −0.05 (0.09)
Weather Info: Phone Apps −0.09 (0.11) 0.01 (0.08)





Logged Income −0.07 (0.25)
Some College −0.34 (0.51)
Bachelors Degree −0.34 (0.54)
Graduate Degree 0.62 (0.56)
African American −0.97 (1.04)
Native American −0.12 (0.79)
Other Race 0.59 (0.69)
Constant 1.34∗∗ (0.66) 8.55∗∗∗ (2.88)
N 1,319 1,319
R2 0.02 0.44
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.43
Residual Std. Error 6.92 (df = 1309) 5.23 (df = 1298)
F Statistic 2.68∗∗∗ (df = 9; 1309) 51.52∗∗∗ (df = 20; 1298)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. Robust std. errors in parentheses.
Reference categories are female, other/independents, HS or less, and White.
of research, looking at the relationships with slightly lower levels of statistical
significance can be warranted. The magnitude of this relationship is similar to
the magnitude for radio as a weather information source as well, suggesting there
is more variance in these effects, represented by larger standard errors. The use
of cable TV as a weather information source is associated with increased cer-
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tainty in the belief that climate change is caused by fossil fuel combustion and
greenhouse gas emissions. When examining how weather information sources are
related to climate change beliefs, including demographic and political covariates
can help make the answers to research question one more clear which is that
certain weather information have small but significant relationships with climate
change beliefs.
Table 3.4: OLS Regression Coefficients for Weather Source Pattern Models
Certainty in (Non)Belief in Climate Change
(1) (2)
Class: Traditional Media −0.83 (0.58) −0.33 (0.47)
Class: Highly Engaged Users −1.56∗∗ (0.77) −0.94 (0.74)





Logged Income −0.06 (0.24)
Some College −0.42 (0.51)
Bachelors Degree −0.49 (0.55)
Graduate Degreee 0.44 (0.57)
African American −0.92 (1.07)
Native American 0.03 (0.80)
Other Race 0.58 (0.68)
Constant 2.62∗∗∗ (0.41) 9.42∗∗∗ (3.04)
N 1,319 1,319
R2 0.004 0.43
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.43
Residual Std. Error 6.94 (df = 1315) 5.26 (df = 1304)
F-statistic 1.55 (df = 3; 1315) 71.42∗∗∗ on (df = 14; 1304)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Reference categories are female, other/independents, HS or less, and White.
Table 3.4 further explicates the relationship between weather information
sources and climate change beliefs by using the Latent Classes identified in the
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previous chapter. These classes represent different patterns for weather infor-
mation source usage. I include the predicted probabilities of class membership
for three of the four classes, omitting the “Website Users” class as the reference
class2. When not accounting for covariates, the predicted probability of being a
Highly Engaged user and an Informal Source user are statistically significant and
negative. Additionally, the predicted probabilities of belonging to these classes
explain very little variance in climate change beliefs. Individuals who are more
likely to belong to these classes have less (more) certainty in the belief that cli-
mate change is (not) human caused. However, once I account for covariates,
these relationships become null. This makes sense given the estimation of the
LCA models in Chapter 2 included these demographic and political variables as
explanatory variables of class membership.
Next I move to examining the data which allow me to answer my second
research question and to test hypotheses three through five in Table 3.5. This
table provides a summary of a keyword analysis of the open ended question
regarding sources of information for global warming. To conduct this analysis,
I used a number of common text pre-processing methods. First, I converted all
words to lower case to account for irregularities in case usage. I then stemmed
all words to their basic roots which you will see for the words onlin-, nation-,
newspap-, televis-, scienc-, and articl-. This allows for all forms of these words
(i.e. scientific or article and articles) to count toward the frequency of the root
word or stem. The word that appeared the most in the responses is by far
news. Approximately 46% of respondents used this word at least once in their
open-ended response about global warming information sources. One common
text pre-processing step I did not take was removing punctuation. I did not
2I choose to omit this class because it accounts for the largest proportion of this sub-sample.
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do this because in such short responses punctuation represents very little of the
analyzed text, as compared to in longer documents. Additionally, because this
is an open ended survey question, the use of punctuation may reflect important
individual differences. It is not required, therefore its inclusion by individuals
may be important.
Table 3.5: Frequency of Users with Keyword Table for Top Twenty Keywords
Word N (%) Word N (%) Word N (%) Word N (%)
news 611(46.3) nation- 85(6.4) friend 58(4.4) articl- 46(3.5)
“,” 477(36.2) onlin- 83(6.3) newspap- 57(4.3) radio 43(3.3)
tv 225(17.1) internet 80(6.1) televi- 52(3.9) cnn 42(3.2)
“.” 184(13.9) local 80(6.1) scienc- 51(3.9) watch 41(3.1)
channel 108(8.2) weather 73(5.5) fox 49(3.7) talk 36(2.7)
After news, Table 3.5 demonstrates the second most common keyword or
token is the comma, appearing in approximately 36% of responses, and the fourth
most common is the period, appearing in just under a quarter of responses. In
this case, the comma is especially interesting as it primarily represents when
respondents listed more than one source for global warming information. After
the top four keywords, the frequency of appearance drops off to below ten percent
of responses. Many of the sources that can be constructed from this list from
the open-ended global warming question mimic both the weather information
sources, such as local television and weather channels, as well as general news
sources such as Fox and CNN. This suggests that there is substantial overlap in
the use of these sources for various information purposes.
I then use these data to examine hypotheses three through five using regression
models similar to the previous ones. One important difference to note is that the
variables that represent these keywords are dichotomous. If a respondent used
that word or token in their response, they receive a 1 for the variable; if not, they
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receive a 0. The results from these models are presented below in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: OLS Regression Coefficients for Global Warming Source Models
Certainty in (Non)Belief in Climate Change
(1) (2)
Key Word: News 0.37 (0.42) 0.52 (0.33)
Key Word: “,” −0.01 (0.63) −0.67 (0.50)
Key Word: TV −0.54 (0.49) 0.42 (0.41)
Key Word: “.” 1.09 (0.76) 0.44 (0.60)
Key Word: Channel 0.95 (0.72) 1.02 (0.64)
Key Word: Onlin- 0.37 (0.84) −0.09 (0.62)
Key Word: Internet −1.47∗ (0.87) −0.50 (0.62)
Key Word: Nation 3.71∗∗∗ (0.63) 2.53∗∗∗ (0.57)
Key Word: Local −1.61∗∗ (0.70) −0.93 (0.64)
Key Word: Weather −0.20 (0.88) 0.30 (0.71)
Key Word: Friend −1.06 (0.96) −0.54 (0.77)
Key Word: Newspap- 0.25 (0.84) 0.96 (0.83)
Key Word: Televis- 0.40 (0.91) 0.63 (0.75)
Key Word: Fox −6.34∗∗∗ (0.85) −2.12∗∗∗ (0.74)
Key Word: Scienc- 1.82 (1.13) 1.08 (0.84)
Key Word: CNN 2.30∗∗ (0.99) 0.57 (0.84)
Key Word: Articl- −1.71 (1.20) −0.45 (0.87)
Key Word: Watch 1.62 (1.00) 1.29 (0.91)
Key Word: Talk 0.07 (1.11) 0.20 (1.02)
Key Word: Radio −3.32∗∗∗ (1.16) −1.40 (0.91)




Logged Income −0.04 (0.24)
Democrat 3.86∗∗∗ (0.45)
Some College −0.23 (0.51)
Bachelors Degree −0.43 (0.53)
Graduate Degree 0.40 (0.56)
African American −0.84 (1.04)
Native American −0.04 (0.82)
Other Race 0.42 (0.68)
Constant −0.97 (0.62) 6.76∗∗ (2.83)
N 1,319 1,319
R2 0.12 0.46
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.45
Residual Std. Error 6.58 (df = 1297) 5.18 (df = 1286)
F Statistic 8.47∗∗∗ (df = 21; 1297) 34.15∗∗∗ (df = 32; 1286)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. Robust std. errors in parentheses.
Reference categories are female, Republicans, HS or less, and White.
In Table 3.6, of the twenty top keywords from the global warming information
source question, six have statistically significant relationships with climate change
beliefs in column one. Only two of these relationships remain significant when
accounting for relevant covariates. Regarding hypothesis three I find support.
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Specifically, the positive coefficient on the variable representing the number of
sources identified in the open-ended global warming information source responses
suggests those who seek out more information about global warming are more
likely to believe it is human caused. This effect, across the range of the variable
from 0 to 7, is actually quite large, covering almost three points of the 21 point
scale . Regarding hypothesis four, I also find support. When individuals rely on
more conservative sources for global warming information they report less(more)
certainty in a belief that combustion of fossil fuels and greenhouse gas emissions
are (not) causing global temperatures to rise. Individuals who report using Fox as
a source for global warming information report, all else equal, more certain belief
that global warming is not caused by greenhouse gas emissions by approximately
2 points, after accounting for partisanship and ideology. This is a substantial
relationship, representing an effect of approximately one-tenth of the entire scale
of climate change beliefs. In the model without covariates, other responses which
are associated with more certainty in the belief that global warming is not caused
by greenhouse gas emissions are ones that use the word local or radio. Local
sources, in particular television, are likely a conservative source and therefore
support hypothesis four as well.
Finally, I find support for hypothesis five, primarily before accounting for
covariates. Most directly, the positive coefficient on the CNN keyword represents
support for this hypothesis. Respondents who use CNN as a source for global
warming information are approximately 2.3 points more certain in their belief that
greenhouse gases are causing temperatures to rise. In both models, the stem-word
of nation is also associated with higher certainty in the belief that global warming
is caused by greenhouse gas emissions. This suggests that national news sources
used for global warming information may be, on average, more liberal, especially
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relative to local news sources. In fact, this effect is the largest positive coefficient
for global warming sources, associated with an increase of approximately 2.5
points of certainty on the 21 point scale. Additionally, the null effect of the word
news suggests that it is specific types of news such as national and local that are
related to certainty in beliefs about the causes of global warming. For all three
global warming information source hypotheses, I find consistent support, across
both models with and without covariates.
Examining each type of information source in isolation does not reflect reality,
however. Individuals are, rather, using these various sources for their various pur-
poses in conjunction with each other. Weather information searches and sources
do not exist outside of or separate from news or global warming information
sources. Thus, the use of separate survey questions to measure these different
sources and purposes allows for examining the effects of information across these
potentially different – news, weather, and global warming specific – contexts on
beliefs about global warming. The results from modeling all of these information
types simultaneously are presented in Table 3.7.
For the models in Table 3.7, I included only the global warming information
variables which were significant in column one of Table 3.6. This reduces the
number of global warming information sources, key words, from twenty to six.
Modeling all of these different types of information a the same time provides a
more nuanced explanation of the ways in which information sources are associ-
ated with beliefs about global warming. For weather information sources, the
relationships which were present in column one of Table 3.3 stay consistent when
including all information types and covariates. Using cable news as a source of
weather information is no longer significant in either model, however. The mag-
nitudes, and direction, of these relationships is remarkably consistent across all of
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Table 3.7: OLS Regression Coefficients for All Information Source Models
Certainty in (Non)Belief in Climate Change
(1) (2)
Key Word: Internet −0.70 (0.71) −0.37 (0.60)
Key Word: Nation- 2.95∗∗∗ (0.58) 2.53∗∗∗ (0.55)
Key Word: Local −0.65 (0.64) −0.51 (0.59)
Key Word: Fox −1.54∗ (0.84) −1.09 (0.75)
Key Word: CNN −1.19 (0.83) −0.50 (0.82)
Key Word: Radio −2.34∗∗∗ (0.85) −1.53∗ (0.83)
Global Warming Information: Number of Sources 0.59∗∗∗ (0.17) 0.27∗ (0.15)
Weather Info: Cable TV 0.06 (0.11) 0.12 (0.10)
Weather Info: Social Media −0.19∗ (0.10) −0.26∗∗∗ (0.10)
Weather Info: Family/Friends 0.27∗∗ (0.11) 0.19∗ (0.10)
Weather Info: Radio −0.25∗∗∗ (0.09) −0.18∗∗ (0.09)
Weather Info: Local TV −0.27 (0.17) −0.13 (0.16)
Weather Info: Govt. Websites 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.10)
Weather Info: Other Websites −0.13 (0.10) −0.08 (0.09)
Weather Info: Phone Apps −0.09 (0.09) 0.002 (0.08)
Weather Info: Newspapers −0.03 (0.12) −0.01 (0.11)
News Source: Fox −0.88∗∗∗ (0.10) −0.22∗∗ (0.10)
News Source: CNN 0.78∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.12)
News Source: MSNBC 0.61∗∗∗ (0.12) 0.17 (0.11)
News Source: New York Times 0.68∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.15 (0.15)
News Source: The Oklahoman 0.10 (0.12) 0.20∗ (0.11)
News Source: Tulsa World 0.31∗ (0.16) 0.08 (0.15)
News Source: Wall Street Journal −0.58∗∗ (0.23) −0.39∗ (0.22)
News Source: Local TV 0.48∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.34∗∗ (0.15)




Logged Income −0.16 (0.24)
Democrat 3.06∗∗∗ (0.46)
Some College −0.40 (0.50)
Bachelors Degree −0.62 (0.53)
Graduate Degree 0.19 (0.56)
African American −1.10 (0.97)
Native American 0.05 (0.81)
Other Race 0.53 (0.75)
Constant −0.20 (0.63) 7.87∗∗∗ (2.86)
N 1,319 1,319
R2 0.34 0.48
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.47
Residual Std. Error 5.72 (df = 1293) 5.08 (df = 1282)
F Statistic 26.10∗∗∗ (df = 28; 1466) 19.21∗∗∗ (df = 40; 1454)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. Robust std. errors in parentheses.
Reference categories are female, Republicans, HS or less, and White.
these models. Using social media and the radio for weather information are both
consistently related with decreased(increased) certainty in the belief that climate
change is(not) caused by greenhouse gas emissions. Using family and friends for
weather information has the opposite relationship. Echoing the relationship for
weather information from the radio, using the radio as a source for global warm-
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ing information is also associated with decreased(increased) certainty in the belief
that climate change is(not) caused by greenhouse gas emissions.
Including Fox as both a news source and a global warming information source
suggests that the effect of Fox on climate change belief occurs primarily through
the use of Fox as a news source. Both the key word coefficient for Fox and
the news source coefficient are statistically significant, at at least the 0.1 level,
and negative in column 1 of Table 3.7. When accounting for partisanship and
ideology, the effect of Fox News as a global warming information source is no
longer significant. For CNN on the other hand, only the news source coefficient
is significant in both models. This suggests the effect of CNN on climate change
beliefs occurs primarily through those who use it for news as opposed to for
global warming specifically. Similarly, the relationship of local sources to beliefs
about global warming is contingent on context. When all types are included
in the model, only local television as a news source is statistically significantly
and positively related to certainty in the belief that global warming is caused by
greenhouse gas emissions. However, local, as a global warming information key
word, and local television as a weather information source have negative, though
not significant, relationships with certainty in this same belief.
In this full model, the support for all hypotheses remains. Conservative
sources, both news and global warming, have negative coefficients and therefore
are associated with less(more) certainty that greenhouse gases are(not) causing
global warming. Liberal sources, primarily through their role as news sources,
are associated with the opposite relationships. I also find that the more sources
reported in the open ended question on global warming information is associated
with higher(lower) certainty in the (non)anthropogenic causes of climate change
in support of hypothesis three. Finally, I test the relative importance of the
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different sets of predictors using the models in column two of Table 3.73. This
method compares the sets of variables contribution to the variance explained by
standardizing the variables and calculating the ratio of the effect standard de-
viations. A ratio of 1.0 means each set contributes equally. When comparing
global warming key words and weather information, the estimate of the ratios is
1.16 but the 95% confidence interval overlaps 1.0, suggesting these two sets of
variables have relatively the same effect on certainty in beliefs about the causes
of climate change. News sources, on the other hand, have a much larger relative
importance. The ratio of effect standard deviations comparing news sources to
weather information sources is approximately 2.01 while comparing news source
to global warming information sources results in a ratio of 2.33, both with 95%
confidence intervals that do not overlap 1.0. This suggests news information
sources are the relatively most important source of information when examining
variation in climate change beliefs4.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I modeled how various types of information are related to in-
dividuals beliefs about the causes of climate change. First, I was interested in
replicating various studies demonstrating the relationship between ideologically
motivated news sources and these beliefs (Feldman et al., 2012; Feldman, Hart
and Milosevic, 2017). Even in a relatively homogeneous sample of Oklahomans,
the effects of political media on beliefs about climate change are apparent. This
suggests particular support for the importance of information in models of be-
3I use the relimp package in R to do so (Firth, 2006).
4Comparing ideology and partisanship to news sources results in a ratio of effect standard
deviations of 2.44, suggesting, perhaps unsurprisingly, that these political variables are possibly
the most important factor in examining variation in climate change beliefs.
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lief formation as compared to the social, psychological model (Carmichael and
Brulle, 2018). Additionally, this further emphasizes the importance of under-
standing biased search processes for information, in this case general news infor-
mation (Stroud, 2011). Additionally, the importance of general news information
is emphasized in this research. This type of information explains the most varia-
tion in beliefs about global warming of all types examined. Once accounting for
partisanship and other covariates, when sources overlap in types, the effect of a
particular source, such as CNN or Fox, has a stronger and more consistent effect
when reported as a general news, as opposed to global warming specific, source.
Next, this chapter examined how weather information is related with beliefs
about climate change. Given that individuals’ experiences of the weather help
explain beliefs about climate change, this research contributes a new type of in-
formation that plausibly relates to climate beliefs (Hamilton and Stampone, 2013;
Egan and Mullin, 2012). Certain weather information types are consistently re-
lated to individuals’ beliefs about the certainty of the causes of global warming.
Specifically, family and friends as a source of weather information is associated
with increased certainty in the belief that greenhouse gases cause global warm-
ing5. Social media and the radio are associated with the increased certainty in
the belief that cliamte change is not human caused, on the other hand. Of the
types of information examined, weather information sources have less explana-
tory power than news sources but similar explanatory power to global warming
information sources. However, given the less political and ideological nature of
this information, weather information may prove a vital tool for changing beliefs
about climate change. While some research has examined the effects of broad-
5Preliminary analysis of an open ended question about causes of change in belief about
climate change provide evidence for the finding that family and friends can change attitudes.
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cast meteorologist’s ability to educate people about climate change (Zhao et al.,
2014), future research ought to further examine how weather information can
be used to educate and change beliefs about global warming. In particular, the
accuracy of forecasts, and individuals’ perceptions thereof, may affect how this
type of information is related to climate change beliefs.
Finally, this chapter examined the effect of self-reported global warming in-
formation sources on beliefs about the causes on global warming. While some
research has asked about sources of information specifically, this has primar-
ily focused on the number of sources listed, as opposed to the specific sources
themselves (Wood and Vedlitz, 2007). Individuals report seeking global warm-
ing information from many of the same sources they receive weather information
and the news from. Certain sources in this type of information have an effect
on beliefs about global warming independent of their effect as a general news
source or weather information source. This suggests that the context of the
information, or at least the survey question and its construction, matters for
examining explanations of climate change beliefs. Some sources have both an
indirect, through news or weather information consumption, and direct relation-
ship with individuals’ beliefs about global warming. Though limited to beliefs
about global warming, the findings from this chapter suggest scholars pay atten-
tion to a wide array of information sources and information types to understand
individual problem definitions and policy beliefs. Even information sources that




Climate Change Beliefs and
Policy Preferences
In the previous chapter(s) I primarily focused on the role of information in ex-
plaining whether or not people believe climate change is caused by humans and
certainty in that belief. In this chapter, I use this belief as an explanatory vari-
able for climate change risk perceptions and policy preferences. I also include
the effects peoples’ everyday environments as measured through experiences of
temperature and rainfall in examining support for climate change policy. In this
chapter, I examine both support for policy addressing climate change generally
as well as the various specific policies.
Policy solutions to the problem of climate change are numerous and multi-
faceted. Politicians have suggested a variety of potential mechanisms to help
address the issue, emphasizing different aspects of the problem and its causes.
Some emphasize market based solutions while others call for more regulatory
power and control. The objects of these policies differ as well with some prefer-
ring to address individuals’ actions while others see intervention at the corporate
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level as potentially more palatable or effective. Policy regarding climate change
has also been construed very broadly with scholars and policymakers suggesting
far reaching connections to issues such as health, education, the economy and job
markets. Understanding the structure of preferences for these policies and how
support for them is grouped may help policy scholars examine how to address
this complex issue (Leiserowitz, 2006a; Dietz, Dan and Shwom, 2007; Ding et al.,
2011).
Similarly important to understanding the structure of policy preferences for
climate change policy is understanding what explains this structure. Scholars of
the policy process have adapted research which was originally conducted at the
institutional or macro level to models of the individual and micro level (Wood and
Vedlitz, 2007; Liu, Robinson and Vedlitz, 2016, 2017). These scholars emphasize
the role of problem perceptions and definitions in explaining policy preferences.
Individuals may focus on particular beliefs about policy problems when choosing
among policy alternatives. Individual demographics and other factors as well as
information sources, in concert with policy specific beliefs such as issue image
and causality, help explain specific policy choices.
In this chapter, I extend the analyses from previous chapters to examining a
variety of policy preferences regarding climate change. I first review the literature
on issue image and causality, with a particular focus on climate change. Using the
same data from wave 18 of the MSIS-Net panel of Oklahomans, I examine a micro-
model of the policy process for climate change policies. I begin by examining the
structure of preferences for these policies and then examine the determinants
of policy preferences from the micro-model of policy choice. I find that risk
perceptions and beliefs about causality, in conjunction, explain policy support
for climate change generally. Previous research has primarily modeled support
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for climate change mitigation policies either using a measure of general support
or with each policy option very much in isolation. I argue, however, that climate
change policies ought to be considered both generally and individually and not
in isolation; this better approximates the discussion among advocacy groups and
provides valuable insight into individual determinants of policy support. I end
the chapter with the implications of this study for policy process research as well
as science communication for climate change.
4.1 Literature Review
Scholars of the policy process have long examined how advocacy groups and
other institutional actors have manipulated problem definitions and images and
in order to support their preferred policy solutions (Kingdon, 1995; Baumgart-
ner and Jones, 2010; Boydstun and Glazier, 2013; Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt,
Weible and Sabatier, 2014; Cobb, 1983). Given that institutions are, to some
extent, organized groupings of individuals, individual policy beliefs may influ-
ence institutional policy choices (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). As such, re-
cently, researchers have suggested individuals issue images are associated with
their support for policy intervention. Issue images are the general perceptions
of the issue or problem a policy is attempting to address; these images are one
of the many components of problem definitions. These scholars argue individual
policy choices are structured by individual policy images, demographic charac-
teristics, and political and issue-specific beliefs (Wood and Vedlitz, 2007; Liu,
Robinson and Vedlitz, 2016, 2017). Problem definitions and images themselves
are structured by these same categories. In this literature review, I first focus
on the determinants of risk perceptions focusing primarily on climate change,
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as an element of issue image. I then review the research on individuals’ policy
preferences for addressing climate change, focusing on the role of risk perceptions
in particular.
4.1.1 Risk Perceptions as an Element of the Issue Image
of Climate Change
Issue image is just one of many elements of problem definition including problem
causality, target populations, and others. Among the many dimensions of prob-
lem definition, scholars have studied how advocacy groups have used issue images
to promote particular policy solutions and hopefully result in change (Stone, 1989;
Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 2010; Schneider and Jacoby, 2003). Is-
sue image is often characterized as an impression of how problems can either
pose harm or policies can provide assistance (Liu, Robinson and Vedlitz, 2016;
Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). At an individual level, issue image can be re-
conceived of as the general beliefs about the benefits or detriments of a policy
issue (Jones, 1994; Baumgartner and Jones, 2010; Liu, Robinson and Vedlitz,
2016). For individuals, these issue images are composed of the strength of a be-
lief and its valence (positive or negative). Some issue images are beliefs that are
hard to change, therefore strong, while others might change more easily. Again
at the individual level, issue images can also be described as a distribution with
some being closer to the mean or median while others are farther from the center
of the distribution and therefore more extreme. Research suggests issue images
help explain changes in a variety of policy domains including disability policy
(Jeon and Haider-Markel, 2001) the death penalty (Baumgartner, De Boef and
Boydstun, 2008), and nuclear waste siting (Sjöberg, 2003).
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Issue images contain perceptions of risks, perceptions of benefits, beliefs about
or descriptions of causality, and various other factors. Risk perceptions, as an
element of issue image, can be explained by a variety of factors. One of the
most studied explanatory factors of risk perceptions as an element of issue image
is demographics. Scholars, in the tradition of Paul Slovic and colleagues, have
demonstrated a consistent “white male” effect. White men have on, average,
lower risk perceptions of many risks compared to their female and racial minority
counterparts (Slovic, 1999; Finucane et al., 2000; Kahan et al., 2007). Education,
income, and other correlated demographic traits such as numeracy have also
been demonstrated to help explain individuals risk perceptions. In some studies,
individuals with higher levels of education perceive higher risks of climate change
(Hamilton, 2011). However, other research has found that numeracy, which is
highly correlated with education, is not related with higher average concern for
climate change. Rather, numeracy interacts with partisanship, particularly as a
Republican, in order to inoculate individuals against concern for climate change
(Kahan et al., 2012). This result has also been demonstrated with education;
Republicans with higher levels of education tend to report lower levels of concern
according to a study by Hamilton (2011).
Political and other beliefs are also related to risk perceptions of climate
change. McCright and Dunlap (2011a, 2013) suggest that the white male effect
on risk perceptions of climate change is primarily concentrated in conservative
individuals. Measures of environmental and general risk are also associated with
specific risk perceptions of climate change and help account for effect of ideol-
ogy on climate change risk perceptions. Cultural values, such as egalitarianism,
are also related to climate change risk perceptions (Leiserowitz, 2006a). Egali-
tarians perceive higher risks of climate change while individualists and hierarchs
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perceive lower risks, on average. Beliefs about the environment, as operational-
ized by the New Environmetal (Ecological) Paradigm (NEP), are also related
to climate change risk perceptions (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher, 1999; Dunlap
et al., 2000; Brody et al., 2008; Carlton and Jacobson, 2013). Those who score
higher on the NEP and therefore have more concern for the environment gener-
ally have higher risk perceptions of climate change. Those with higher concerns
for economic issues, however, have lower perceptions of the risk of climate change
according to Carlton and Jacobson (2013).
In a comprehensive effort to model climate change risk perceptions, Van der
Linden (2015) finds support for each of these category of variables in explaining
climate change risk perceptions in a sample from the UK. They find that experi-
ential factors, such as experiences of extreme weather, and socio-cultural factors
help explain risk perceptions better than socio-demographic or cognitive factors,
such as knowledge of the causes of climate change or affect.
In addition, many scholars of risk and environmental studies have examined
the effect of risk perception on individual attitudes and behavior toward policy
choices. The measurement of risk perceptions is highly varied; however, most are
scales that range from extremely low or no risk to extremely high risk, usually
with a neutral position in the middle. These studies have found that higher risk
perceptions are associated with individuals’ behaviors and can lead to more indi-
vidual support for government mitigation policies (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher,
1999; Martin, Martin and Kent, 2009; Maestas et al., 2018; Leiserowitz, 2006a).
Additionally, numerous studies have demonstrated the effect of issue causality
on individual policy choice. Scholars have found that people who believe that
climate change is caused by human activities tend to support government poli-
cies regarding climate change more than those who do not (Leiserowitz, 2006b;
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O’Connor, Bord and Fisher, 1999; Bord, Fisher and O’Connor, 1998; O’Connor
et al., 2002). This review leads me to my first proposition:
Proposition One: Risk perceptions, as an element of individual issue images,
will be explained by demographics, political dispositions, and issue-specific
concepts and beliefs.
4.1.2 Determinants of Individuals’ Policy Choices
Individuals’ policy choices are complex and have many potential explanatory
factors. Recently, Robinson and colleagues (2017) reviewed a broad range of
existing literature regarding individuals’ policy choices. As with risk perceptions,
individual attitudes towards policy choice are primarily constructed by three sets
of explanatory factors: demographics, political predispositions and issue specific
variables.
The first set of explanatory factors is individual demographic characteristics.
Public opinion and policy scholars have well documented the important contex-
tual relationships between a large variety of demographics and individuals’ policy
choices or preferences. Most consider basic demographic characteristics includ-
ing age, gender, and education in order to account for potential confounding
effects. However, some evidence suggests that individual attributes are stable
and stronger predictors than other social determinants in the formation of policy
support for environmental and risky policy (Jones and Dunlap, 1992). Existing
studies suggest these factors capture important individual differences that struc-
ture preferred policies. Zahran et al. (2006) relate demographics to the concept of
personal capability. Those with higher capabilities to pay or take action against
climate change are more likely to support mitigation policy (Berk and Schulman,
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1995; Berk and Fovell, 1999). Lubell et al. (2006) find that education and knowl-
edge increase actions taken to mitigate climate change. Zahran et al. (2006) also
suggest gender is related to capability, finding that males are less likely to sup-
port climate change mitigation policies. However, as previously mentioned, these
relationships are often contingent upon the policy area under consideration (Liu,
Robinson and Vedlitz, 2017).
The second set of explanatory factors is political predispositions. Trust, ideol-
ogy, party affiliation and other general attitudes toward government and the en-
vironment have been shown to explain individuals policy preferences across many
domains (Song, Silva and Jenkins-Smith, 2014; Reckhow, Grossmann and Evans,
2015; Ding et al., 2011; Mumpower, Liu and Vedlitz, 2016). These variables serve
as underlying filters through which individuals process their policy choice (Taber
and Lodge, 2006; Rudolph and Evans, 2005). For instance, individual support
for various policy choices has been explained by party identification and ideology
(Lubell et al., 2006). Trust and beliefs about governmental knowledge, especially
as they vary by level of government, have been shown to be related to individuals
policy preferences (Murphy, Greer and Wu, 2018). However, for climate change,
Dietz, Dan and Shwom (2007) find that trust in environmental groups and in-
dustry better explain support for climate policy than trust in government. In
addition, cultural theorists have also found that individuals’ views toward gov-
ernment authority shape individuals’ policy choices and support (Dake, 1991;
Leiserowitz, 2006b; Stoutenborough, Sturgess and Vedlitz, 2013).
Finally, more recent research examining policy preferences for certain issues
has emphasized the importance of issue specific explanations (Robinson, Stouten-
borough and Vedlitz, 2017). These variables include an individual’s attention,
knowledge, experience and specific characteristics about the issue at hand. Is-
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sue attention is usually conceptualized as a time-bound activity which indicates
interest or experience with a policy issue or problem; some measures of issue at-
tention include Google search patterns (Ripberger, 2011), concern about energy
supply (Liu, Robinson and Vedlitz, 2017), use of news media (Holt et al., 2013),
and others. In particular, there have been multiple studies indicating that is-
sue attention is associated with policy choices (Liu, Robinson and Vedlitz, 2017;
McCright, 2008). Liu, Robinson and Vedlitz (2017) find that issue attention
is associated with reduced support for nuclear energy as a solution to climate
change. On the other hand, McCright (2008) finds that issue attention is associ-
ated with increased support for a variety of effective policy solutions to climate
change. Another issue specific explanation is personal experience. Previous stud-
ies have shown that individuals who directly or indirectly experience disastrous
events have higher risk perceptions of climate change and are highly likely to sup-
port mitigation policies addressing those events (Van der Linden, 2015; Spence
et al., 2011; Slovic, 2000). Objective risk, operationalized as geographic vulner-
ability, to the effects of climate change as also been shown to be correlated with
individuals subjective risk perceptions and policy support (Brody et al., 2008).
Leiserowitz (2006a) finds strong evidence that experiential elements, such as af-
fect, are related to support for climate change policy. Beliefs about causality
of climate change are also strongly related to both risk perceptions and policy
support (Leiserowitz, 2006b; O’Connor, Bord and Fisher, 1999; Bord, Fisher and
O’Connor, 1998; O’Connor et al., 2002; Ding et al., 2011). However, findings
in this domain are somehat mixed as Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz (2008) find
that ‘informedness’ is negatively correlated with concern for global warming and
personal responsibility toward it. They find that higher confidence in science and
scientists is also related to lower levels of individual action. Ding et al. (2011) find
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that belief in scientific consensus mediates many of these effects on support for
climate policy. Reviewing determinants of policy choice, with regards to climate
change, leads me to the following propositions:
Proposition Two: Individual policy support will be explained by demographics,
political dispositions, and issue-specific beliefs.
Proposition Three: Certainty in the belief that climate change is (not) caused by
human activity will be associated with higher (lower) levels of policy support.
Proposition Four: Individuals with higher risk perceptions will have higher levels
of support for climate policies.
4.1.3 Measurement of Climate Policy Support
Climate change is a multifaceted policy issue with a plethora of possible solutions.
Some solutions emphasize industry regulation while others emphasize regulating
or changing individual behaviors. Some policy solutions have more obvious costs
to individuals such as regulations that raise gas prices. Other climate policies
costs are more submerged such as tax credits or rebates for purchasing solar
panels or electric cars. Many studies of climate change policy consider these
alternatives in isolation. One of the most studied policies which would help ad-
dress climate change, and is framed as such, is the use of nuclear energy. Scholars
have examined how beliefs about climate change are related to support for nu-
clear power plants (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Corner et al., 2011; Visschers, Keller
and Siegrist, 2011). When framed as potentially mitigating the effects of climate
change, individuals will support nuclear energy and power plants slightly more;
however, this is also contingent upon their risk perceptions of both nuclear energy
and climate change. Another policy that commonly comes up in discussions of
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climate change that has been studied in isolation is a carbon tax (Avi-Yonah and
Uhlmann, 2009). Studies of public opinion on carbon taxes find that support
is highly contingent on the described uses of the revenues (Amdur, Rabe and
Borick, 2014). Other policies which would have climate change mitigation effects
include the development of renewable energy. These policies have generally high
levels of support that vary by location, with most studies showing that proxim-
ity to the projects is associated with increased support as opposed to decreased
(Wolsink, 2000; Devine-Wright, 2005, 2011).
Despite the various dimensions of these policies, most studies combine these
various policies into a single scale. Zahran et al. (2006) combine 11 different
items, or policies, into a singular scale. These range from taxes on individuals
and industries to education policies regarding climate change. Ding et al. (2011)
combine six different policy items when measuring policy support. Their policies
include ratification of international treaties and adding surcharges to individuals
electric bills. Leiserowitz (2006a) combines climate policies into two indexes;
the first measures general climate policy preferences while the second measures
preferences around tax policy. Dietz, Dan and Shwom (2007) combine 8 measures
into a singular climate change support variable. Compared to other research,
they attempt to define each policy in terms of trade-offs and their effects on
individuals budgets. Similarly, McCright, Dunlap and Xiao (2013) combine only
three measures, each of which relates to emissions standards and regulations.
Across these studies, it is clear there is a variety of measurements of policy
support regarding climate policy with most scholars collapsing these variables
into one, maybe two, scales. These studies find desirable properties of these
scales and use these properties to justify their decisions to combine measures.
Following these studies, I also combine my measures of climate policy support
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into a single index. However, given the variety in the designs of these policies, I
also conduct separate analyses for each policy individually and ask the following:
Research Question One: How do the determinants of general climate policy
support differ across the various individual climate change policies?
4.2 Data and Methods
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for all models run in this chapter. These
data come from Wave 18 of the MSIS-Net panel survey of Oklahomans described
in further detail in Jenkins-Smith et al. (2017). Based on the preceding review
of research on climate change risk perceptions and policy support, I arrive at
the list of independent variables described below. Many of these independent
variables in this study were measured in a variety of ways. Demographics were
measured in usual ways. Age and income are continuous self-reports. Levels of
education were recoded to dummy variables for high school or less, some college,
bachelors degree, graduate school with the lowest level being omitted. Race is
also coded as a set of dummy variables with white or Caucasian respondents as
the omitted category. Location of home lot is coded as three dummy variables
for suburban, urban, and rural with suburban omitted. Partisanship is coded as
1 for Democrat and 0 for Republican1. Ideology is a seven point scale where 1
represents strongly liberal while seven represents strongly conservative2.
Certainty in the human causes of climate change is measured on a scale from
negative ten to positive ten, with negative ten representing extreme certainty
1Independents were asked which party they leaned toward and are included as such. Re-
spondents, n = 93, who replied Other Party are coded as NA.
2Both political variables were not collected in Wave 18. Therefore, I use data on these
variables from Wave 17 which was fielded approximately three months earlier.
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that climate change is not caused by humans and fossil fuel combustion and
positive ten representing extreme certainty that it is. Perception of temperature
change is a three point scale where 1 represents respondents who believe spring
2018 was cooler than previous springs, 2 represents those who believe it was
exactly the same temperature, and 3 represents those who believe it was warmer.
Concern for energy cost and natural resource preservation are measured on ten
point scales where 0 represents no concern and 10 represents extreme concern.
Time spent outside is measured using a 5-point scale where 0 represents no time
outside on a typical spring day, 1 represents less than an hour a day, 2 represents
1-2 hours a day, 3 represents 2-4 hours a day, and 4 represents more than 4
hours a day. Season precipitation and temperature departures are measured using
the actual weather data. Respondents were paired with the closest Mesonet
station as described in Jenkins-Smith et al. (2017). The average precipitation
and temperature for the past 15 years at those stations for each season were then
calculated. These variables then represent the difference between the average for
all springs in the preceding 15 years and the actual average, both temperature
and precipitation, for spring 2018. Finally, health status is measured using a
question about respondents general health. This measure ranges from 1 for poor,
2 for fair, 3 for good, 4 for very good, and 5 for excellent.
Dependent variables for this study were also measured in multiple ways. First,
risk perceptions of global warming is measured using a ten-point scale where 0
represents no risk and 10 represents extreme risk to people and the environment.
Then each of the climate change policy options were measured using a four point
scale where 1 represents strongly opposed and 4 represents strongly support.
These indicators where further collapsed into binary indicators, with strongly
support and somewhat support coded as 1 and strongly oppose and somewhat
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Complete Responses, n = 1,684
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Risk Perceptions of Global Warming 6.06 3.03 0 10
Policy Support Scale 3.00 0.73 1.00 4.00
Four Point: CO2 Limits 2.87 0.99 1 4
Four Point: Carbon Tax 2.77 1.02 1 4
Four Point: Renewables Research 3.29 0.83 1 4
Four Point: Public Land 3.26 0.85 1 4
Four Point: Tax Rebates 3.19 0.85 1 4
Four Point: Regulate CO2 2.96 0.95 1 4
Four Points: 20% Rule 2.69 1.04 1 4
Binary: CO2 Limits 0.68 0.47 0 1
Binary: Carbon Tax 0.65 0.48 0 1
Binary: Renewables Research 0.86 0.35 0 1
Binary: Public Land 0.85 0.36 0 1
Binary: Tax Rebates 0.84 0.37 0 1
Binary: Regulate CO2 0.73 0.45 0 1
Binary: 20% Rule 0.60 0.49 0 1
Demographics
Age 61.7 13.5 21 95
Male 0.42 0.49 0 1
Income 73,000 57,000 10,000 900,000
Some College 0.32 0.47 0 1
Bachelors Degree 0.29 0.46 0 1
Graduate School 0.26 0.44 0 1
African American 0.03 0.17 0 1
Native American 0.04 0.21 0 1
Other Race 0.04 0.20 0 1
Urban 0.19 0.39 0 1
Rural 0.38 0.49 0 1
Political Dispositions
Democrat 0.43 0.49 0 1
Ideology (Conservative) 4.58 1.75 1 7
Issue Specific Variables
Certainty in Human Causes of Climate Change 1.86 6.95 −10 10
Perception of Temperature Change 2.20 0.96 1 3
Concern for Energy Cost in OK 6.54 2.58 0 10
Concern for Natural Resource Preservation in OK 7.03 2.36 0 10
Time Spent Outside 2.14 0.97 0 4
Season Precipitation Departure from 15 Year Average −3.08 1.65 −7.20 4.96
Season Temperature Departure from 15 Year Average 0.58 0.45 −0.21 1.87
Health Status 3.40 0.93 1 5
oppose coded as 0, as presented in the table. The questions for these policy
preferences were presented in a random order and were as follows:
• Set strict carbon dioxide emission limits on existing coal-fired power plants
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to reduce global warming and improve public health. Power plants would
have to reduce their emissions and/or invest in renewable energy and energy
efficiency. The cost of electricity to consumers and companies would likely
increase.
• Require fossil fuel companies to pay a carbon tax and use the money to
reduce other taxes (such as income tax) by an equal amount.
• Fund more research into renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind
power.
• Generate renewable energy (solar and wind) on public land in the U.S.
• Provide tax rebates for people who purchase energy-efficient vehicles or
solar panels.
• Regulate carbon dioxide (the primary greenhouse gas) as a pollutant.
• Require electric utilities to produce at least 20% of their electricity from
wind, solar, or other renewable energy sources, even if it costs the average
household an extra $100 a year.
The correlations between these policy preferences for all complete observations
are presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Pearson correlation coefficients for all climate change policy solutions
CO2 Limits Carbon Tax Renewable Research Public Land Tax Rebates Regulate CO2 20% Rule
CO2 Emission Limits on
Coal-fired Plants
1 0.649 0.546 0.442 0.496 0.736 0.654
Carbon Tax on Fossil Fuel Companies 0.649 1 0.496 0.436 0.503 0.667 0.539
Fund Renewable Research 0.546 0.496 1 0.597 0.542 0.533 0.559
Generate Renewables on Public Land 0.442 0.436 0.597 1 0.462 0.454 0.502
Tax Rebates on Energy Efficient
Vehicles and Solar Panels
0.496 0.503 0.542 0.462 1 0.508 0.497
Regulate CO2 as Pollutant 0.736 0.667 0.533 0.454 0.508 1 0.622
Require Utilities to Produce 20% of
Energy from Renewables
0.654 0.539 0.559 0.502 0.497 0.622 1
All correlations are statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. n = 1,684.
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Given the strong positive correlations of the policy support variables, I ran a
principal components analysis to further examine the dimensionality of support
for climate change policies. Examining the scree plot in Figure 4.1, only the first
eigenvalue exceeds one, suggesting a unidimensional structure. The Cronbach’s
alpha for this scale is 0.89, removing any single policy solution reduces this score,
further suggesting the intercorrelations between the policy solutions are high3.




















In the following section, I first model risk perceptions of climate change as
3A Latent Class Analysis, similar to those estimated in Chapter 2, was also run. This
analysis resulted in a minimized BIC for 4-classes; however, the largest class, accounting for
50% of respondents had high predicted probabilities of support for all policies. Future analyses
might consider this method. For clarity, brevity, and diversity of analysis types, I am excluding
it from this chapter.
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a function of individual demographics, political dispositions, and policy/domain
specific variables and beliefs. Then, given the weight of this evidence, in the next
section, I model climate change policy preferences as the average of the 4-point
indicators for all seven policies. I also model climate policy preferences using
seven separate logit analyses to examine if the determinants of climate change
policy are stable across the various alternatives.4
4.3 Findings
Table 4.3 presents the results from OLS regressions for both climate change risk
perceptions and the policy solutions scale. Examining Model 1, a few important
relationships become apparent. First, I find that certainty in the belief that fossil
fuel combustion and greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change is strongly
and positively related to risk perceptions of climate change. Regarding demo-
graphics, the only significant effects are related to home location; individuals
in urban and rural areas have lower risk perceptions of climate change, relative
to their suburban counterparts. Political party has a strong relationship with
risk perceptions; Democrats have higher risk perceptions of climate change than
Republicans. Ideology, on the other hand, has a negative relationship with risk
perceptions. As individuals become more conservative, their risk perceptions of
climate change are lower. In line with previous research, I find that percep-
tions of higher temperatures, as opposed to actual deviations from average, are
associated with higher risk perceptions of climate change. On the other hand,
everyday experiences of precipitation are associated with lower risk perceptions.
4Robust standard errors are presented for OLS regressions due to the presence of het-
eroskedasticity in the residual term as evidence by the studentized Breusch-Pagan test. VIFs
were also calculated for all models; all were less than 3 indicating limited multicollinearity in
the models.
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This may be driven by prior experiences with drought, which is perceived as risky
to crops in particular, driving positive affect toward rainfall and therefore lower
risk perceptions. Finally, I find that individuals who are concerned for energy
costs and natural resource preservation, in particular, in Oklahoma also report
higher levels of risk associated with climate change. Thus, I find strong support
for proposition one that risk perceptions are explained by demographics, political
dispositions, and issue-specific beliefs and concepts.
Examining general support for policies addressing climate change, I find sim-
ilar patterns in many cases and support for my second proposition. In Model
2, I model support for climate policy without the effect of climate change risk
perceptions and then in Model 3 I include the effect of risk perceptions on policy
support. Across both models, most effects are generally consistent. Males are
significantly less likely to support climate change policy than their female coun-
terparts. Belonging to the Democratic party is associated with higher levels of
support for policies addressing climate change as is concern for natural resource
preservation in Oklahoma. Conversely, the more conservative an individual is
the less they support climate change policies. The effect of perceptions of higher
seasonal temperatures is insignificant across both models. Similarly deviations
from average precipitation are unrelated to support for climate policies. How-
ever, on the other hand, deviations from climate averages for temperature are
positively associated with support for policy solutions to climate change, across
both models. Regarding proposition three, climate change risk perceptions are
also positively associated with support for climate policy support. A change from
the minimum to the maximum across risk perceptions is associated with an al-
most 1-point change in policy support, or almost 25% of the support scale. While
most relationships are stable across models 2 and 3, the effect of certainty in the
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression Coefficients
Climate Change Risk Perceptions Support for Climate Policy Solutions, 4-Point Scale
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Climate Change Beliefs
Certainty in Causes of Climate Change 0.25∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.003) (0.003)
Climate Change Risk Perceptions 0.08∗∗∗
(0.01)
Demographics
Age −0.001 −0.002∗ −0.002∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Male −0.02 −0.16∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03)
Logged Income −0.06 −0.03 −0.02
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
Some College 0.08 0.02 0.01
(0.16) (0.05) (0.04)
Bachelors Degree 0.12 0.03 0.02
(0.16) (0.05) (0.04)
Graduate School −0.01 0.06 0.06
(0.17) (0.05) (0.05)
African American 0.20 −0.19∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.08) (0.08)
Native American 0.29 0.10 0.07
(0.25) (0.07) (0.06)
Other Race −0.01 0.04 0.04
(0.21) (0.06) (0.06)
Urban −0.19∗ 0.01 0.02
(0.11) (0.03) (0.03)
Rural −0.32∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.04
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03)
Political Dispositions
Ideology −0.29∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Democrat 0.54∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.06∗
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03)
Issue Specific Variables
Perception of Temperature Change 0.09∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Concern for Energy Cost in OK 0.05∗∗ 0.004 0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Concern for Natural Resource Preservation in OK 0.18∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Time Spent Outside −0.02 −0.004 −0.003
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Season Precipitation Departure from 15 Year Average −0.05∗∗ −0.01 −0.003
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Season Temperature Departure from 15 Year Average 0.15 0.07∗∗ 0.05∗
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03)
Health Status 0.02 −0.01 −0.01
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 5.50∗∗∗ 3.37∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗
(0.84) (0.25) (0.24)
N 1,684 1,684 1,684
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.53 0.56
Residual Std. Error 1.72 (df = 1662) 0.50 (df = 1662) 0.48 (df = 1661)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories are female, high school or less, white, suburban, and Republican.
human causes of climate is reduced by 40% with the inclusion of risk perceptions.
In order to examine the change in the coefficient on certainty in causes of
climate change, I use the mediation package in R to conduct a mediation analysis
(Tingley et al., 2014). Doing so, I examine how risk perceptions mediate the effect
of beliefs about the causes of climate change on policy support, using Models 1
and 3 in Table 4.3. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 4.2;
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uncertainty estimates are calculated using 1000 simulations of a quasi-Bayesian
Monte Carlo method based on normal approximation. Approximately 43% of
the relationship between certainty in the cause of climate change and climate
policy support is mediated by climate change risk perceptions. In support of
proposition four, I find that the ADE or the Average Direct Effect of certainty in
the causes of climate change is 0.026. However, I also find that the Average Causal
Mediated Effect, mediated through risk perceptions, is 0.020. This suggests that
the effect of beliefs about the causes of climate change is, in approximately equal
proportions, a direct effect and an in-direct effect through risk perceptions.
Figure 4.2: Plot of effect sizes from mediation analysis of risk perception through
beliefs about climate change causes









Next, to answer my resarch question, I examine the seven climate change
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policy solutions individually in Table 4.4. Doing so allows me to see how the
determinants of support for climate policy may differ across these various policies.
In Table 4.1, the most popular policy to address climate change is increasing funds
for renewable research which is the dependent variable in Model 35. On the other
hand, the least supported policy is the 20% rule which would require utilities to
produce 20% of their electricity using renewables but raise electricity bill prices
and is the dependent variable in Model 7. These differences may illuminate
certain similarities and differences found in Table 4.4.
Looking across these seven models, a few patterns are apparent. Risk percep-
tions of climate change is consistently associated with an increase in the predicted
probability of supporting climate change policy solutions. A one-point increase
in risk perceptions, across the ten-point scale, is associated with a change in
predicted probability of support for a climate change policy of approximately
0.02 0.04. The strongest effects are in Models 2 and 7 which may be due to the
fact that these survey questions most directly address the trade-offs between the
policy and the increase in benefits (costs) to the public. No other variable has a
significant effect across all policy solutions. For six of seven policies, excluding the
use of public land to generate renewable energy, beliefs about the human causes
of climate change are also associated with positive effects and higher predicted
probabilities.
Demographics have, in many cases, limited relationships with support for
specific policies. One of the most consistent effects is that of being male which
is associated with a lower predicted probability of approximately 0.02 to 0.18
of support for four of seven policies. Age has slight negative relationships with
5Another class in the LCA supports the renewables policies: tax rebates for individuals,
research, and public land use. Each of these options has over 80% of the sample in support of
the policy in Table 4.1
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Table 4.4: Marginal Effects at the Mean for Logit Models of Policy Support
CO2 Limits Carbon Tax Renewable Research Public Land Tax Rebates Regulate CO2 20% Rule
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Climate Change Beliefs
Certainty in Human Causes of Climate Change 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.00 0.004∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Risk Perceptions of Climate Change 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01)
Demographics
Age 0.001 −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.00) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male −0.12∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.02 −0.03∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.05∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Logged Income 0.02 −0.004 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Some College −0.002 −0.07 −0.01 −0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.005
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Bachelors Degree −0.02 −0.11∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.04 0.005
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Graduate School −0.01 −0.09∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.02 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
African American −0.16 −0.05 −0.02 −0.08 −0.13 −0.25∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Native American 0.07 0.06 −0.02 −0.004 −0.01 0.06∗ 0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Other Race 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 −0.01 −0.02
(0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
Urban 0.02 −0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03∗ −0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Rural −0.07∗∗ −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.03 −0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Political Dispositions
Ideology (Conservative) −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democrat 0.13∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.01 −0.02 0.02 0.10∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Issue Specific Variables
Perception of Temperature Change 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.003 0.00 0.01 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Concern for Energy Cost in OK −0.005 0.02∗∗∗ 0.003 0.005 −0.001 0.003 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.01)
Concern for Preservation in OK 0.02∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004 −0.01∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01)
Time Spent Outside −0.005 −0.002 −0.004 −0.01∗ −0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Season Precipitation Departure from 15 Year Average −0.01∗ −0.01 0.01∗ 0.01 0.001 −0.005 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01)
Season Temperature Departure from 15 Year Average 0.05∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.02 −0.02 0.01 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Health Status −0.002 −0.01 −0.01 −0.002 0.003 −0.004 −0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Constant −0.27 0.25 0.27∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.12 −0.13
(0.23) (0.26) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.28)
N 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684
AIC 1,441.97 1,695.87 1,105.22 1,287.58 1,272.48 1,335.02 1,741.81
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Reference categories are female, high school or less, white, suburban, and Republican.
policies which are framed explicitly in terms of taxes: the carbon tax on coal-
fired power plants and the tax rebates for individuals who purchase efficient
vehicles or solar panels. High levels of education, especially graduate school,
are associated with statistically significant increases in support for renewables
polices. Interestingly, education is associated with either positive or null effects
on policy support except for carbon taxes. Individuals with higher levels of
education, bachelors degree or greater, report lower levels of support for carbon
taxes relative to individuals with a high school education or less. Race, being
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African American, has a significant effect on support for the 20% rule and the
regulation of CO2. The 20% rule is the policy made most explicitly costly to
the individual. These relationships suggest complexity in modeling support for
climate policy not present when modeling it as a general concept as opposed to
separate but possibly related policies.
Political party and ideology have generally consistent effects across policies.
Conservative ideologies are generally associated with less support for each policy.
The strongest relationship is for the policy most explicitly costly to individu-
als while the weakest relationship is for the use of tax rebates for individuals.
Democratic partisanship has more mixed results. Being a Democrat, relative to
a Republican, is associated with increased support for three of seven policies. For
the other four, partisans are indistinguishable from each other.
Many issue specific variables also have mixed relationships with support for
various policies. Perceptions of higher temperatures are not significantly related
to support for any individual policy while experienced actual higher temperatures
are associated with increased support for limiting CO2 emissions, carbon taxes on
coal-fired plants, and a 20% renewables rule for utilities. On the other hand, de-
viations from average rainfall amounts are associated with decreased support for
limiting CO2 emissions and increased support for renewables research. Interest-
ingly, rainfall deviations had no statistically discernible relationship with general
policy support; though what is driving these particular differences is not clear.
In relationships masked in the more general model of policy support, I find that
concern for energy cost is associated with policies which most directly address
individuals’ costs. Individuals with higher levels of concern for the cost of energy
in Oklahoma are more likely to support the carbon tax policy which was de-
scribed as possibly reducing personal income taxes. Concern for the preservation
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of natural resources is generally positively associated with support for the climate
policies and is significant in four of seven cases. On the other hand, concern for
preservation is negatively associated with support for the use of public lands to
generate renewables. Similarly, time spent outside has a null relationship with
support for six of seven policies but is negatively associated with support for the
use of public lands to generate renewables. Given the importance of public lands
in preservation of natural resources and their use in recreation, these relation-
ships provide interesting nuance in understanding the determinants of support
for climate policy relative to the general policy support model.
4.4 Discussion
The findings in this chapter contribute to an extensive literature on risk percep-
tions, issue image, and policy support. First, I find that actual experience and
perceived experiences of temperature are related to risk perceptions of climate
change, in support of other strong evidence that experience matters (Van der
Linden, 2015). Other environmental beliefs also help explain risk perceptions of
climate change, in line with previous research. Interestingly, these beliefs and per-
ceptions are significant in explaining risk perceptions while actual experiences or
measurements of temperature and precipitation, potential side-effects of climate
change, are not.
Regarding personal capability, I find similar results to previous research on
the effect of education and knowledge on policy support (Zahran et al., 2006).
However, I find less support regarding income, the ability to pay, and support
for policy in contrast with previous research (Berk and Schulman, 1995; Berk
and Fovell, 1999). In particular, I find a strong relationship between knowledge
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of the causes of climate change and policy support. Importantly, though, this
relationship is mediated by the relationship between risk perceptions and policy
support. This suggests a complex relationship between beliefs about climate
change and support for mitigation policy. The effect of causal beliefs is almost half
driven by a mediated pathway through risk perceptions. This suggests improving
knowledge about the causes of climate change may be less effective at creating
policy support, generally, than increasing risk perceptions may be. Similarly, the
results of the individual policy models suggest risk perceptions are consistently
and strongly significant in explaining policy support while beliefs about causality
are slightly less so.
Finally, unlike previous research by Leiserowitz (2006a), Dietz, Dan and
Shwom (2007) and others, I disaggregate climate mitigation policies. Doing so
suggests that, despite the statistically desirable structure of the index, support
for policies are explained by different individual level characteristics depending on
the policy characteristics. Policies, such as using public lands to generate renew-
ables, which could have potentially negative effects on conservation, preservation,
or recreation are explained differently than other more regulatory policies. Specif-
ically, time spent outside is negatively related to support for the use of public
land for renewable generation, but unrelated to other policies. Similarly, concern
for natural resources is positively related to climate policies, except this one.
Similar conflict regarding the development of wind power and the location of the
wind farms has been termed “green on green” conflict (Warren et al., 2005). The
relationship between public opinion climate change concern and nuclear energy
also demonstrates a similar somewhat paradoxical pattern (Corner et al., 2011).
Concern for local environmental impacts, in this case the loss of public lands, out-
weigh concern for the abatement of the global environmental impacts of climate
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change.
Additionally, policies which explicitly discuss costs, such as the 20% rule
which would increase consumer energy costs, are better explained by capability
variables and concern for energy costs than other climate mitigation policies.
These findings suggest the previous research using scales of policy support may be
covering up interesting and important variation in policy support. For example,
while policy actors may rely on environmental groups and attitudes to increase
support for climate change policies, this may not work for all policies. Similarly,
ability to pay and act have differential effects as the effects and costs to the public
differ in their levels and visibility across policies.
These results, as with all studies, are limited by a number of factors. First,
the use of a sample of Oklahomans is certainly not representative of the U.S.
in general. Given these policies would likely be applied at a national level, this
may also affect how respondents in Oklahoma respond. One possible benefit of
this sample is the ability to examine beliefs and concern for the local area, which
is held constant, are related to these national level policies. Second, this study
relies on a cross sectional design and therefore I have attempted to constrain
my language to that of association. These relationships are not causal; future
research should use experimental and longitudinal designs to see how changes in
key explanatory variables are related to changes in risk perceptions and support
for policy, especially. Finally, the seven policies examined individually do not
begin to account for the wide variety of potential policies addressing aspects of
climate change. Additionally, the construction of the survey questions measuring
support for these policies could be more consistent. Three of the seven questions
discuss a trade-off as a result of the policy but the other four do not and are
presented more simply. Future research ought to consider a wider variety of
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policy options as well as be sure to consistently consider the trade-offs these
policies present.
However, overall, the results from this chapter suggest first that understand-
ing the determinants of risk perceptions is highly important for understanding
support for policy, generally. Additionally, while one can measure support for
climate change policy generally, looking at these policies individually and not in
isolation provides more insight into the determinants of support for them. Schol-
ars ought to revisit the variation in their data to better develop theories about
which aspects matter for climate change policy support. Capacity may matter
more than than socio-cultural beliefs and vice versa, depending on the specific
policy solution. Additionally, and practically, understanding these differences





This dissertation develops a comprehensive model of weather information and
climate change beliefs and support for policy. Scholarship examining the deter-
minants of climate change beliefs have investigated a number of different cate-
gories of factors. These categories can generally be summarized as demographic
and identity factors including political identities and beliefs, environmental and
experiential factors, and informational factors with an emphasis on news sources
(Robinson, Stoutenborough and Vedlitz, 2017; Liu, Robinson and Vedlitz, 2017;
Carmichael and Brulle, 2018; Van der Linden, 2015). While these categories are
relatively comprehensive, I argue in this dissertation that they miss an important
intersection of two of the categories – experience and information. In studies of
climate change beliefs, experience is primarily operationalized as measured tem-
peratures or precipitation, and in particular deviations from average, or disaster
experience (Egan and Mullin, 2012; Spence et al., 2011; Van der Linden, 2015).
Sometimes perceptions of temperatures deviations are also included as experience
measures (Zaval et al., 2014). Regarding information, scholars have primarily fo-
cused on the news media (Carmichael and Brulle, 2018). At the intersection
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of these two categories is the potential for by-product learning though weather
information. Weather information, similar to the news, is consumed by individ-
uals almost everyday. This source of information represents a yet untested, but
interesting and likely, pathway for influence on climate change beliefs. In Chap-
ter One of this dissertation, I lay out the previous research and various theories
and concepts that inform my investigations into the relationship between weather
information and climate change beliefs.
However, even in the weather community, everyday, mundane interactions
with weather information and forecasts have been relatively understudied. De-
muth, Lazo and Morss (2011) briefly describe potential patterns of mundane
weather information; however, they find limited evidence of patterns and there-
fore do not report their potential findings. This same set of scholars has, however,
have found that these very resources are highly valued by the American public
(Lazo, Morss and Demuth, 2009). Scholars of weather and geography have pri-
marily focused on the use of information in severe weather situations (Sherman-
Morris, 2010; Miran, Ling and Rothfusz, 2018). These studies find that informal
sources such as peers can be vital pathways of information but that individu-
als also seek out more formal sources for confirmation. Use of more sources is
also associated with better protective action decision-making in severe weather.
Therefore, understanding how these patterns might arise from mundane, daily
use of weather information sources can provide insight into how to create sys-
tems which promote wide usage of weather information and confirming behaviors
which then, potentially, increase protective action. Therefore, in Chapter Two
of this dissertation, I examine patterns of mundane, daily weather information
source usage.
Using a survey of a relatively diverse sample of Oklahomans, I find that
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weather information usage can be summarized into four patterns, using Latent
Class Analysis with concomitant variables. This method allows me to use the pat-
tern of source usages of each individual and their correlations as my data points,
as opposed to simply relying on correlations between the indicators themselves.
This method better captures the concept of weather information patterns than
similar methods such as factor analysis which rely on treating the indicators, or
information sources, as individual data points. I then examine what typifies or
describes these patterns and individual, demographic explanations for member-
ship in these class. In line with prior research on information in severe weather, I
find that local television is by far the most used source (Hammer and Schmidlin,
2002; Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Sherman-Morris, 2010). However, examin-
ing the underlying patterns provides more nuance. The sample is divided into
three approximately equal size classes and a fourth, smaller class. This fourth
smaller class is a group of highly engaged individuals who use all sources more
than average. Among the other three, each accounting for approximately 25 to
30% of the sample, the largest group is typified by their greater than average
reliance on websites, both governmental and non-governmental, for weather in-
formation. These individuals are in direct contrast to those who rely on older,
traditional media such as local and cable television stations and newspapers. Fi-
nally, there is a group of individuals whose pattern of information usage is reliant
on above average use of informal sources of weather information such as their
family and friends and social media.
Demographics are strongly associated with which group individuals belong
to and their information use pattern or strategy. Age, in particular, is strongly
associated with a higher likelihood of belonging to the traditional media reliant
group and a lower likelihood of belonging to the informal source reliant group.
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Education is associated positively with usage of the informal source and website
use patterns and negatively with the traditional media and highly engaged use
patterns. Race is primarily associated with use of the highly engaged pattern,
with all minorities more likely to use this pattern than their white counterparts.
African Americans, in particular, are also much more likely to belong to the
traditional media use group and less likely to belong to the informal source use
group. Finally, ideology has a limited but interesting relationship with class
membership. Specifically, more conservative individuals are more likely to rely
on informal sources and less likely to rely on website sources, including govern-
ment websites. Given the general lack of trust in media and government among
conservatives, these findings suggest this applies even to weather information use
(Rudolph and Evans, 2005; Jones, 2004).
In Chapter Three of this dissertation, I then examine the relationship between
these weather information use patterns, and weather information sources individ-
ually, on beliefs about the causes of global warming or climate change. I argue
that this type of information represents an untapped pathway for by-product
learning about climate change (Downs, 1957; Prior, 2007). Weather information
is presented, often, in inherently climatological terms and therefore in the process
of learning about the weather individuals may learn about climate, and climate
change, as well. I present these findings in terms of the more general information
environment as well which has been extensively shown to be related to climate
change beliefs (Carmichael and Brulle, 2018).
I find that weather information, in conjunction with other types of informa-
tion, does help explain variation in beliefs about the causes of climate change.
While the patterns developed in Chapter Two are not significantly related to cli-
mate change beliefs, individual indicators of weather information are. Specifically,
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I find that use of cable television and family and friends for weather information is
associated with increased (decreased) certainty in the belief that climate change is
(not) caused by human activities. Radio and social media, on the other hand, are
associated with decreased (increased) certainty in the belief that climate change
is (not) caused by human activity. These findings, except for cable television,
hold even when accounting for relationships between ideology, partisanship, and
use of more partisan news sources such as Fox and CNN.
Before accounting for ideology, I also find that Fox news is associated with
decreased (increased) belief in the (not) human causes of cliamte change as both
a general news source and specific source of information for global warming. Im-
portantly, I find that general news sources have the highest relative importance
in explaining variation in climate change beliefs, compared to weather and global
warming information sources. However, the relative importance of ideology and
partisanship also outweigh the importance of general news source. These findings
suggest scholars of climate change beliefs consider a wide array of potential in-
formation sources. By-product learning may be occurring about climate change
during the process of more daily, mundane information processing. Practically,
these findings suggest individuals or groups interested in increasing belief in the
human causes of climate change investigate social media and radio weather infor-
mation sources more in-depth. How can individuals who communicate through
these sources provide more climatologically accurate information? Are the indi-
viduals who provide weather information through these sources more politically
conservative or disbelieving in the human causes of climate change than other
providers of weather information? These findings also suggest that in-person
social networks and information are working to increase the belief that climate
change is caused by human activity.
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Finally, in Chapter Four of this dissertation, I extend my analysis of climate
change beliefs to include risk perceptions thereof and policy preferences for ad-
dressing climate change. In this chapter, I connect the literature on risk percep-
tions with a developing literature on the micro-model of policy process and public
opinion (Finucane et al., 2000; Liu, Robinson and Vedlitz, 2017). Most studies
model support for climate policy as an index of the many different policy options
which could help address climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006a; Zahran et al., 2006;
Dietz, Dan and Shwom, 2007; Ding et al., 2011; McCright, Dunlap and Xiao,
2013). Others study certain policies which would help address climate change
individually and in isolation (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Corner et al., 2011; Amdur,
Rabe and Borick, 2014). I argue that studying support for policies which address
climate change is best done both in a general manner and in a policy-by-policy
manner, in conjunction not in isolation.
Regarding risk perceptions of climate change, I find that demographic and
political dispositions help explain variance in similar ways to beliefs about the
causality of climate change. Specifically, political variables such as ideology and
partisanship as well as general environmental beliefs help explain individual risk
perceptions of climate change. I find that certainty in the human causes of cli-
mate change is positively associated with support for climate change policy. I
also find that risk perceptions are positively associated with general support for
climate change policy. More interestingly, I find that risk perceptions mediate ap-
proximately 43% of the relationship between causal beliefs and risk perceptions.
This suggests that beliefs about causality and risk perceptions, both elements
of issue image, help explain policy choice in conjunction. The policies which
make up the climate policy support index which possesses many good statisti-
cal properties of an index have significant variety in their designs. Therefore, I
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also model the determinants of each policy individually. These models provide
interesting nuance into the foundations of support for the various policies. These
differences may provide insight to environmental groups or policymakers inter-
ested in building support for policies to address climate change. Specifically, I
find that policies which have other environmental trade-offs are not supported
by people with higher levels of local environmental concern or who spend more
time outside, despite those people supporting climate policy in general. I also
find that the more explicit cost trade-offs present in the policy, or at least in the
survey question about the policy, the more important are variables that measure
or are proxies for capability to pay or act in explaining support. These find-
ings suggest that the combination of understanding climate policy generally, as a
set of policies, and understanding those policies individually provides interesting
theoretical and practical insights.
In this concluding chapter, I would like to acknowledge a few limitations of this
dissertation. First, one potential limitation that will always arise is the use of data
only from Oklahoma. Do I think these patterns will generalize to the U.S. as a
whole? Preliminary evidence from a national survey suggest that, to some extent,
they do. In future research, I intend to extend my analysis of weather information
patterns to national data to compare and contrast the resulting four-class solution
and its predictors. Regarding climate change beliefs, I think the results may also
generalize. Given the overwhelming influence of ideology and partisanship in my
study, common in studies using national data, I would argue that the much more
limited but still interesting findings regarding weather information from these
studies would likely hold as well. The findings from Chapter Four are also very
much in line with prior findings on risk perceptions and policy support; therefore,
I think the more nuanced findings I present about individual policies and their
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predictors would also likely generalize.
Another potential limitation of this dissertation is the use of cross-sectional,
observational data. Effectively, I am unable to make causal claims using these
data and methods. The prospectus for this dissertation aimed to use the panel
nature of the underlying data to bring estimates of causality to these questions
that I am interested in. Given constraints, I was unable to implement these am-
bitions in this dissertation; however, in future work, I hope to better understand
and master panel data management and analysis to eventually, hopefully be able
to render claims about causality potentially. More specifically, the use of panel
data will give insight into invariance in attitudes and time-order of changes, even
if estimates of causality may be unattainable. Despite the lack of causal claims,
these findings are still important from a descriptive stand-point, especially given
how untested and innovative the connection between weather information and
climate change beliefs appears to be. Future research also should consider ways
of measuring the actual climate content of these different sources of weather in-
formation. While I provide evidence in this dissertation that by-product learning
is occurring, I am unable to provide clear evidence of how or why. My argu-
ment relies on an assumption that these channels of weather information contain
different amounts of and perspectives on climate information when communicat-
ing mundane, daily weather information. Future research, likely using machine
learning or “big data” collection techniques and content analytic methods, can
be used to document the existence, or non-existence, of the potentially different
types of climate content in these information sources.
Despite these limitations, in this dissertation, I have modeled the development
of climate change beliefs beginning with information about climate change and
weather, moving to beliefs about the causes of climate change, to risk perceptions
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of climate change and policy solutions thereof. Throughout, especially in Chap-
ters Two and Three, I have attempted to emphasize the importance of everyday,
mundane activities, such as searching for weather information, which might influ-
ence our political beliefs, possibly more than we even expect. In Chapter Four, I
consider other elements of everyday existence such as experienced rainfall and ex-
perienced and perceived temperatures and how they relate to risk perceptions of
climate change and climate change policy support. I argue that it is these daily,
lived experiences that shape who we are and how we think. Despite the po-
tentially mundane nature of daily experiences and information search processes,
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